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A.  INTRODUCTION  
 
This report presents some evidence of the effects of globalisation (including trade 
liberalisation) on poor rural producers in the Philippines. It includes two case studies on the 
vegetable sector  and the poultry sector.  
 
The paper examines some aspects of the globalisation and liberalisation process that has had 
effects on rural producers.  In particular it looks at the effects of trade liberalisation that was 
undertaken as part of the Philippines’ commitments under the World Trade Organisation.   
The social effects of liberalisation on rural producers (including on income, livelihoods and 
food security) are examined.  The paper also briefly examines the effects of trade 
liberalisation on  IFAD’s operations, by looking at its implications for IFAD’s CHARM 
project in the Philippines.   
 
In the two case studies, quantitative and qualitative methods are used.  These include in-
depth interviews and group discussions in these communities; gathering and analysis of 
statistics and information from the Department of Agriculture, the Municipal offices and 
Rural Health Offices, and a review of literature on these issues.   
 
Two areas were chosen for the case studies, one being involved in vegetable growing and the 
other in poultry raising.   
 
The first case study (on vegetable growing) was done in the Cordillera region, in Barangay 
Cattubo of Atok Municipality in Benguet Province. This is an area in which an IFAD project 
has been undertaken, i.e. the Cordillera Highland Agricultural Resource Management 
(CHARM) project.  The project has a budget of US $41.4 million, most of it financed by loan 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD).   
 
This area was chosen for the case study for two reasons.  Firstly, this is a typical indigenous 
peoples’ village which used to be engaged in subsistence production but later shifted to cash 
crop production with the facilitation of government programs. The indigenous people here 
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have been engaged in raising vegetables on a commercial scale since the l940s up to the 
present. Secondly, this is a CHARM project area and it is therefore a beneficiary of IFAD 
funding.  Since one of the objectives of the study is to look at the impact of globalisation on  
IFAD’s operations, the village was chosen.  The CHARM project’s main objective is 
alleviating poverty in its implementation areas in the Cordillera region.  It was implemented 
from June l997 and the final year was 2004.  It would be useful to see what the impact of the 
project hass been on alleviating poverty in the community and whether the achievement of 
this goal was affected by trade liberalization. 
 
The second case study was done in Southern Tagalog region in the Municipality of 
Alaminos, Laguna Province. This is a rural poultry-producing lowland community. It can be 
reached from Manila in two to three hours. This municipality is also involved in raising corn 
and rice. It is also a fourth class municipality but unlike the first area it is well served with 
electricity and it has piped water. One of the key areas liberalized in the agriculture sector is 
the poultry and livestock industry.  It was thus decided to undertake a case study of a 
community involved in the poultry sector to examine the structure of the poultry industry, 
including the relations between its various levels (the large “integrator” firms, the contractor 
farmers who supply them, and the backyard poultry farmers).  Some aspects of the effects of 
import liberalisation on the community and the sector are also examined. 
 
 
B.  BACKGROUND ON THE TRADE POLICY AND AGRICULTURE SITUATION 
OF THE PHILIPPINES  
 
 
Agriculture Situation and Rural Poverty in the Philippines  
 
The Philippine economy is still basically agricultural.  Two-thirds of its population of 75.3 
million and three fourths of the poor depend mainly on agriculture for their livelihood. 
Performance in this sector has been weak.  The sector’s contribution to GDP was 20% during 
the 1995-2000 period. However its share of total employment was much higher at 40% 
during this same period.  (Gonzales 2003).  
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, agriculture consistently had a growth rate of about 5 percent. This 
went down to 2 percent in the 1990s. From 1995 to 1999, after the accession of the 
Philippines to the WTO, the agricultural sector grew only by an average of 1.8 percent. 
Agricultural imports significantly increased, due to import liberalisation, and total exports 
decreased. In l985 agricultural imports compared to exports was 46 percent and in l998 this 
ratio increased to 151 percent.1  
 
                                                 
1Briones, Angelina, National Study: Philippines, 2002, in  Organic Agriculture and Rural Poverty Alleviation, 
Potential and Best Practices in Asia, UN-ESCAP. Bangkok.    
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Data providing a profile of rural poverty in the Philippines, based on the current official 
practice in poverty measurement2,  show there is very slow progress in improving the poverty 
situation.  Rural poverty fell from 56 percent in l985 to 51 percent in l997. However, the 
number of poor people increased from 18.7 million to 19.6 million. The rural poor still 
account for 70 percent of poor people in the country. (Canlas and Fujisaki, 2001). Table 1 
shows in more detail the picture of rural poverty as well as poverty in the agriculture sector 
through the years. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Alfredo Balisacan’s estimates based on Family Income and Expenditure Survey 
(National Statistics Office), various years)3 
 
 
The Philippines government has also been tepid in supporting agriculture, as seen in the low 
and declining shares of the agriculture sector in government expenditure and in government 
loans.  The government spent less than 5 percent of total government expenditure on this 
major sector during the ten years 1992 to 2001.  The share given to agriculture as a portion of 
total government expenditure in fact declined from 3.3% in 1992 to 3.1% in 2001 (See Table 
2).    
 
                                                 
2
 This entailed estimating the minimum income levels – i.e. sufficient to meet the nutritional norm and othe 
basic needs- for urban and rural areas in each region. A household with an annual income, adjusted for family 
size, below the relevant threshold, is deemed poor. (Based on National Economic Development Authority 
definition).  
3
 Balisacan, Arsenio, Rural Development in the 21st Century: Monitoring and Assessing Performance in Rural 
Poverty Reduction, 2001,  in Canlas and Fujisaki, The Philippine Economy: Alternatives for the 21st Century”, 
University of the Philippines Press, Quezon City. 
Table 1: Rural Poverty Estimates Based on Official Measurement 
Practice 
 
      1985         1988         1991       1994       1997 
Rural 
 Incidence (%)                  56.4          52.3         55.0       53.1        51.4 
 No. of Poor Persons    18,744       18,118     17,346   17,988     19,591 
 (in thousands) 
Share in total poverty (%)          70.2          71.4         60.8       65.7         72.2  
 
Agriculture (urban and rural) 
 Incidence      63.7          61.7         63.7       62.0        60.3 
  No. of poor persons 16,344       15,552     17,910   18,103    17,561 
            (in thousands) 
Rural Share in total poverty     61.3            61.7       62.7       66.2        64.7 
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Government Loans to agriculture have also been very low, amounting to only 1 percent of 
total loans granted to all sectors in 1998 onwards.  The share had declined from 5.3% to 0.9% 
in 1997, rising only slightly to about 1% in 1998-2000.  (Table 3). 
 
 
 
Table 2.   Share of Agriculture Sector in Total Government Expenditure,  
Philippines  1992-2001 
 
             
 
                 ITEM 
1992 1994 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001P 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON 
AGRICULTURE  (MILLION PESOS) 
9,366 10,075 19,100 17,354 26,847 28722 21,623 
TOTAL NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURES (MILLION PESOS) 
286,603 327,768 445,735 537,433 580,385 682,460 699,878 
SHARE OF AGRICULTURAL 
EXPENDITURE IN TOTAL 
NATIONAL GOV’ERNMENT  
EXPENDITURES  (%) 
3.27 3.07 4.29 3.23 4.63 4.21 3.09 
 
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, Department of Agriculture 
P
 Preliminary 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Share of Agriculture Sector in Total Government Loans,  
Philippines, 1992-2001 
 
 
 
 
ITEM 
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001p 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
LOANS GRANTED (MILLION 
PESOS) 
46,164.5 47,878.1 62.211.7 90,525.0 103,511.4 110,007.1 111,650.2 
TOTAL LOANS (BILLION PESOS AT 
CURRENT PRICES) 
879.80 3,145.28 3,387.50 10,141.48 9,909.13 10,644.57 10,327.44 
SHARE OF AGRICULTURAL 
LOANS IN TOTAL LOANS (%) 
GRANTED RATIO (%) 
5.25 1.52 1.84 0.89 1.04 1.03 1.08 
 
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, Department of Agriculture 
p Preliminary 
u Data unavailable
                                                 
 
 5
 
 
The low priority accorded by the Philippine government to agriculture contrasts with how 
governments of developed countries protect their agriculture.  The US administration has adopted 
a farm bill, the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act with subsidies amounting to US$180 
billion.4    Under this scheme, transnational companies such as Cargill Corporation and Monsanto 
are able to continue buying commodities from farmers at artificially low prices and “dump” these 
commodities by exporting them to developing countries at prices below the cost of production.  
The US in fact exports corn and wheat at prices 20% and 46% below production cost, 
respectively.5 
 
U.S. exports of poultry products increased rapidly during the 1990s and now contribute 
substantially to its positive agricultural balance of trade.  In 1999, US total value of poultry 
product exports was $2.1 billion, while the value of all its poultry imports was only $210 
million.  Its $1.89 billion surplus from poultry trade accounted for 18 percent of the $10.4 
billion US agricultural trade surplus.  Exports of broiler meat account for most of the poultry 
meat exports, over 90 percent of the volume and approximately 68 percent of the value. 
Turkeys, eggs, and prepared meat products each account for about 6-7 percent of the value of 
poultry exports.6 
 
The Philippines is one of the major importers of US pork and poultry products. The US 
notified the Philippine Government in April 1, 1997 that it intends to bring to the WTO a 
case against the Philippine Government’s for its failure to implement its Uruguay Round 
tariff rate quota commitment on pork and poultry. This was highlighted as a key issue in a 
trip report of the US  Committee on Agriculture Congressional Delegation to Thailand and 
the Philippines in l997. 7    According to this report the Philippines MAV quota commitments 
should take effect by July 1, l995 but the Philippine Congress did not enact an enabling 
legislation for this to happen. Because of technical errors committed during the Uruguay 
Round the Philippines proposed a renegotiation of its import commitments for pork, poultry 
and live poultry. Unfortunately , this was rejected by the US which had a clear vested interest 
in opening up significantly the Philippine market to its poultry products. (Habito, 2002)  
 
The European Union also maintains very high domestic support for agriculture, which also 
allows its food companies to buy cheaply from farmers and to sell at artificially low prices to 
developing countries. 
 
It is likely that the high domestic subsidies in the US and EU will remain, although they may 
shift the subsidies from one category to another, to comply with their commitments in the 
WTO. Despite this, the developing countries are being asked to further reduce their 
agricultural tariffs, this time even more steeply than they did under the Uruguay Round.  
                                                 
4
 Akande, Wole. How agriculture subsidies in rich countries hurt poor nations, October 19, 2002, 
YellowTimes.org 
5
 ibid. 
6
 Dale Colyer, Division of Resource Management, West Virginia University  
7
 Summary of the Committee on Agriculture Trip to Thailand and the Philippines, Committee on Agriculture 
Congressional Delegation to Thailand and the Philippines, May 24-June 1, 1997.downloaded from 
http://www.house.gov/agriculture/105/thaiphil.htm, 19 April 2006. 
 6
 
Agricultural Reforms and Implications of WTO Commitments  
 
Although attempts had been made to liberalise Philippines agriculture since the 1960s, it is 
only with the country’s entry into the WTO in 1995 that extensive liberalization has taken 
place across the sector. 
 
In the 1960s, the initial attempt was made in trade reform.  The reform policy included 
decontrol, import and export licensing was no longer required and the fixed exchange rate 
policy was ended.  However, due to balance of payments problems, industry protection and 
import controls were imposed, and the number of regulated commodity lines in fact rose 
from 1,307 in 1970 to 1,820 in 1980. 
 
In the 1980s, a second attempt was made at trade reform.  This was carried out as part of the 
structural adjustment programme under the World Bank and IMF advice.  An import 
liberalisation programme (ILP) and a tariff reform programme (TRP) were implemented. 
Tariff rates were reduced under the TRP from 100 percent to between 10 to 50 percent. 
Under the ILP, the proportion of restricted items was reduced from 24 to 20 per cent.  
However, because of the economic crisis in l983, the ILP was postponed for three years. 
Import liberalisation resumed in 1986, mostly on industrial goods and also on fertiliser and 
wheat (but not for imports of agricultural commodities); and agricultural export taxes were 
removed (Gonzalez, 2003).  
 
Another round of tariff reductions was implemented in the 1990s.  Executive Order 470 in 
1991 reduced the number of high-tariff lines over five years (to 1995).  It also increased the 
number in low-tariff lines.  The majority of commodity lines fell within the 10-30 percent 
rates.  Executive Order 8 was issued in l992 which removed quantitative restrictions (QR) 
and replaced this with tariffs.  This was however reversed. Because of a strong demand from 
the farmers’ movement, a Magna Carta for Small Farmers Law (RA 7607) was enacted. In 
1993, Memorandum Order 95 restored QRs on agricultural products on corn, pork and 
poultry (but not for beef and sugar).  The aim of the law was to enable products to be grown 
locally in sufficient numbers (Gonzales 2003).  
 
Another victory for the farmers during this period was the passage of the Seed Industry 
Development Act (RA 7308) which prevented the importation of seeds when these are 
sufficiently produced in the country.  
 
However, these laws were short-lived.   The government passed the Agricultural Tariffication 
Act of l995 (Republic Act 8178) which repealed these two laws. This Act also repealed the 
law prohibiting the importation of onion, potato, garlic and cabbage (RA 1296) and coffee 
(RA 2712); and centralizing the importation of beef (RA 1297). The tariffication of QRs was 
an integral part of this Act. Between 1995-96, the initial bound tariffs for some sensitive 
agricultural products were within 10-50%. This Act ensured that all sensitive products 
(which includes maize, poultry, onion, potato, garlic, cabbage, etc.) will fall within this range 
and  QRs will be replaced by tariffs twice the final rates committed in l995.(Aquino, 2004).  
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All these were done as part of the implementation of the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture 
(AoA). 
 
The Philippines made very significant commitments under the AoA to liberalise its imports.  
Firstly, all quantitative restrictions were eliminated and converted to tariffs.  Secondly, the 
country committed to significantly reduce its agricultural tariffs.  The commitment, common 
for developing countries in general, is for a reduction in the average bound agricultural tariff 
by 24 percent, with a minimum 10 percent cut per tariff line (to be implemented from 1995 to 
2004).    
 
According to data in Gonzales (2003: p441-442), the bound overall agricultural tariff rate for 
the Philippines was scheduled to decline from 19.6% in 1997 to 14.5% (1998), 14.3% (1999) 
and 13.3% (2000).  Even more important are the commitments that affect the tariff rates on 
the country’s sensitive agricultural products.  At the start of the implementation period in 
1995-96, 50% of the most sensitive products have high bound rates of 95-100 percent with 
another 22% of products in the 55-90 percent tariff levels.  However, by 2003, the 
Philippines committed to place 90% its most sensitive agricultural products in the 35-50% 
tariff category.  Thus, 50% of sensitive products that had tariffs of around 100% in 1996 
would now have tariffs of 35-50%, which represents a very significant decline in protection 
from imports. For vegetables, the situation is even worse. President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo released Executive Order No. 164 in January 2003,  which stipulated that the current 
applied rates for most vegetables (except cabbage and onion) will be seven percent.  
 
Besides reduction in tariffs, the Philippines also committed to enhance market access through 
tariff rate quotas, or the offer of giving minimum access volumes (MAVs).  Within these 
volumes, lower tariffs are applied, thus enabling market access, whereas tariffs beyond the 
MAV levels would have higher tariffs applied to them.  The Philippines committed to MAVs 
equivalent to 3 percent of the level of 1986-88 domestic consumption of the affected items, 
to be applied for 1995; rising to 5 percent of the 1986-88 consumption level to be applied for 
2004.     
 
The MAV mechanism is an important one for facilitating imports, even when the out-of-
quota tariff is high.  It is thus an important factor affecting the competitive environment of 
local small farmers.   The Philippines agreed to allocate a minimum volume of imports of 
certain goods as a “minimum access volume” (MAV).  Within this quantity, imports would 
be subjected to lower tariff levels while at quantities above the MAV level, significantly 
higher tariffs would apply.  It is thus important what the MAV is for the products concerned;  
the higher the volume, the greater the amount of imports are subjected to low tariffs, thus 
allowing these quantities to gain access to the Philippines market. 
 
The situation became more serious than it could have been due to serious technical mistakes 
made by the Philippine negotiators when they were negotiating the WTO Agreements. When 
the Philippines entered the MAV amounts in its schedule of commitments in the Agreement 
on Agriculture, it made mistakes.  It committed larger minimum MAVs beyond what it 
intended to do or was required to do.  For example, although the Philippines intended to 
commit only 2,570 heads of swine as its MAV, it incorrectly committed almost 2.6 million 
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heads.  What is important for our case study on chicken, the Philippines committed 5.7 
million heads of live poultry and 14,090 metric tons of poultry meat, when it had intended to 
commit only 1.65 million heads of live poultry and 2,218 metric tons of poultry meat.   
 
Thus, the market access provided for these items were far above what had been intended or 
required under the Agreement on Agriculture.  Table 4 shows the erroneous minimum access 
commitments and the correct amounts that should have been committed. 
 
There was a huge outcry from the public about this mistake, and the Philippine government 
tried to have the errors rectified. However, the United States, European Union and Japan 
objected, and the amounts that had been originally placed in the schedule had to stand. Thus, 
the country remained burdened with these minimum access commitments.  One result was 
that the growth in cheap imported chicken and chicken parts was higher than what it could 
otherwise have been. This growth started in 1996 and more than 85% of the imported 
chicken parts came from the US. 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
On the domestic front, the government promised to take measures to soften the negative 
impact that agricultural liberalization would have on the sector and on small farmers.  The 
package of support promised included an action and budget plan for Uruguay Round 
adjustment measures (safety nets); enactment of legislation (for example, Agriculture and 
                                                 
8
 “Fowl raisers cry ‘foul’”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 18,2000, p.1. 
Table 4:  ERRORS IN WTO COMMITMENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES 
MINIMUM ACCESS VOLUMES FOR AGRICULTURE ITEMS 
             
            Initial Quota Quantity for l995 
               Quota incorrectly         Quota that should 
                                          committed              have been committed  
 
Live Swine (head)       2,570,000                2,570       
Live Poultry (head)           5,708,120                    1,655,700          
Pork (metric tons)            32,520                            3,600                
Poultry meat (mt)                   14,090                            2,218                   
Sugar (metric tons)          103,400                          38,000  
 
Source:  Department of Trade and Industry, cited in Guzman (1999). 
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Fisheries Modernisation Act) to provide tariff reduction on inputs; legislation to provide 
trade remedies to act as safeguards against import surges, injury to domestic industries and 
dumping; and budget support to agriculture of Peso 73 billion from 1995 to 1998 (under the 
Uruguay Round Action Plan), support for irrigation of Peso 28 billion from 1995 to 1998 and 
Peso 6 billion per annum from 1999 to 2004. 
 
However, these commitments to assist domestic agricultural producers have been inadequate, 
showing that the country was ill prepared to help the sector and its farmers cope with the 
effects of liberalization.  The Department of Agriculture (DA), in 2001, admitted to a “virtual 
non-existence of domestic support structure” and that the government, six years into the 
agreement, has not enacted and enforced trade remedy laws on anti-dumping, countervailing 
measures, and special safeguard measures. 
 
As stated above, the government promised to establish a 128 billion pesos fund for safety 
nets, infrastructure and competitiveness-enhancing public investments in recognition of the 
possible negative implications of the country’s entry into the WTO.  According to the 
Department of Agriculture, the government was able to meet only 40 percent of this 
commitment.  The government also provided domestic support in agriculture amounting to 4 
percent  of  the value of  agricultural  production, which  was  below  the 10  percent  allowed  
under the WTO rule. 
Compliance with the AoA ushered in an era of much greater “openness” of the Philippines 
agriculture sector.   The Uruguay Round was anticipated to result in agricultural export 
benefits for developing countries like the Philippines.  However, export performance has 
been very disappointing.  In fact the performance in the post-Uruguay Round period was 
worse than in the pre-WTO period.  In 1985-94, agricultural export earnings increased on 
average by 2.5% per annum, whereas in 1995-99 the average growth rate was a mere 0.18%. 
Pointing to these figures, Gonzales (2003) in his Philippines case study for the FAO says that 
the decline in agriculture export growth rates was reflected in the declining share of 
agricultural exports in total Philippine export receipts (from 16% in 1985-94 to 8% in 1995-
2000).  Tariff and non-tariff protection were the cause of non-expansion of Philippines 
agricultural exports.  On the latter, Gonzales (2003: p455) cites the case of banana and 
pineapple exports to Australia being hindered by sanitary and phyto-sanitary requirements, as 
standards were suddenly raised to protect Australia’s inefficient banana and pineapple 
farmers. 
While exports stagnated, Philippine imports have surged since the WTO’s Agreement on 
Agriculture came into force. 
The trend of surging agricultural imports, with export value stagnating, can be seen in Table 
5.   Between 1991 and 1998, imports increased from US$1,260 million to US$2,895 million 
while exports only rose from $1,845 million to $2,225 million.  This has resulted in a 
dramatic worsening of the agricultural trade balance of the country.  The balance of 
agricultural trade turned around from a surplus of $585 million in 1991 to a deficit of $670 
million in 1998.   The trade deficit continued in 1999 and 2000. 
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Data from Gonzales (2003: 458-463) provide more evidence of the country’s worsening 
agricultural trade situation.  In 1985-94, agricultural exports averaged US$1,260 million a 
year, and imports averaged $1,103, thus resulting in a surplus of $157 million a year.  
However, in 1995-99, exports averaged $1,703 million while imports averaged $2,627 
million,  resulting in an average net deficit of $924 million a year.   During the post-Uruguay 
Round years 1995-99, export earnings grew 0.18% a year on average while imports grew by 
8.01% a year. 
 
Another troubling finding is that Philippines agriculture has become less globally 
competitive since the implementation of the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture.  According 
to Gonzales (2003: p444): “The impact of the AoA was generally a decline in global 
competitiveness among sensitive Philippine agribusiness products.”   Studies that analysed 
the competitiveness of rice, corn, beef cattle, hogs, broiler and eggs in the pre-AoA period 
(1994) and the post-AoA period (1999) showed that these products were competitiveness as 
import substitutes before the signing of the AoA, but such competitiveness was eroded 
subsequently.   “The major reason for this decline in cost competitiveness was due to the 
general unpreparedness of Philippine agriculture to face global competition” (Gonzales 2003: 
p444).  
  
 
 
Table 5: BALANCE OF TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS,  
PHILIPPINES (1990-2000)   (FOB Value in million US Dollars)    
________________________________________________________________________ 
          
                      Exports           Imports             Balance of Trade 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1990  1,701   1,555   146 
1991  1,845   1,260   585 
1992  1,866   1,560   306 
1993  1,918   1,626   292 
1994  2,072   2,114              (42) 
1995  2,499   2,649            (150) 
1996  2,307   3,096            (789) 
1997  2,338   3,102            (764) 
1998  2,225   2,895            (670) 
1999/a     718              1,244                       (527) 
2000/a     809              1,105                       (297) 
 
/a Jan to May figures only 
 
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics  
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The deterioration in the Philippines’ agricultural trade position and the rapid liberalisation of 
imports in particular has had adverse effects on the local small farmers. Small scale rural 
producers compose the majority of the agricultural sector in the Philippines. The poultry and 
livestock sector, for instance, is mainly a backyard industry. 75 percent of producers of 
poultry and livestock are backyard raisers and they contribute to 80 percent of the total 
production.9     
Most of the vegetable growers are also small-owner tillers. Around 70% of the country’s 
total supply of potato, cabbage and other semi-temperate crops are produced in the Cordillera 
region , particularly in Benguet and Mt. Province. The region is considered as the Vegetable 
Belt of the country. This may not be the case in the near future as the entry of cheap imported 
vegetables has directly affected the livelihood of local producers. In 1981 when the country 
started to import vegetables, 4.62 million kilograms of vegetables entered the local market. 
After the WTO agreements came into force, vegetable importation surged to 171.37 million 
kilograms worth $243 million in 1997.  Benguet farmers reportedly lost Peso 2.1 billion in 
potential earnings when 82.7 million kilograms of fresh vegetables and root crops from the 
United States, Australia, China and Taiwan entered the country in the first half of 2002. 
The impact of agricultural liberalization, specifically the reduction of tariffs, is recognized by 
the Philippine Congress as elucidated in Resolution No. 570 of the House of Representatives 
(12th  Congress, 14 January 2003). This Resolution stated that “the removal of quantitative 
restrictions and the more than halving of average nominal tariffs in the sector…has caused 
imported vegetables to flood the domestic market with an almost three-fold increase from 
42,000 metric tons (MT) in l995 to 115,000 MT in 2000.” These vegetable imports could 
have been easily raised by local farmers. The United States, Australia, New Zealand, the 
Netherlands, Singapore and China were identified by this Resolution as the sources of cheap 
vegetable imports.   
The case studies which follow will show in more detail the effects of liberalisation on rural 
producers engaged in vegetable and poultry production.  
 
 
 
C.  CASE STUDY ON VEGETABLE PRODUCERS IN BARANGAY CATTUBO, 
ATOK, BENGUET PROVINCE 
 
 
1.  GENERAL 
 
The 2002 Regional Development  Report revealed that the incomes in rural areas are 
improving, from an average family income of  PhP52,841 in 1991 to PhP64,969 in 2000. 
However, the National Economic Development Authority admitted that income distribution 
is not getting any better (NEDA-RDR, 2003).  Furthermore, the gap between the incomes in 
urban  and  rural areas  have remained more than twofold.  The income profile by decile 
groups show that the mean income of families belonging to the 10th  or highest decile group 
                                                 
9
 Ibid. 
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was more than ten times higher than that of families belonging to the 1st or poorest decile 
group, with  PhP312,633 mean family income and PhP20,789 mean family income 
respectively (NEDA-RDR, 2003).   
 
One major source of income in the region of this case study is the vegetable industry. The 
vegetable industry, for many years, has been the top peso earner in the region.   The province 
of Benguet has been the main supplier of the vegetable needs of the whole  country.  In the 
first half of 2002,  Benguet province was supplying 80% of the country’s total vegetable 
consumption.  The later half of the year showed a drastic change because of massive 
vegetable importation.  
 
The vegetable industry has been considerably weakened with the implementation  of the 
Agreement on Agriculture. This was admitted by the Department of Agriculture when it said 
that high value crops like potato and cabbage will have an uncertain future due to import 
competition.   The effects of the once hazy and seemingly unknown phenomenon of 
liberalization were widely felt by the vegetable producers in the year 2002 when there was a 
sudden drop in vegetable prices. 
 
The story of indigenous rural farmers in barangay Cattubo, Atok municipality, Benguet 
province is representative of what has happened in various vegetable growing areas in the 
region. 
 
This case study sought to answer two main questions:  firstly, to examine the effects of the 
globalization processes (which includes  trade liberalization) on the income, prices, markets 
and livelihoods in Barangay Cattubo, Atok, Benguet province; and secondly, to assess how 
globalization has affected the achievement of  the CHARM Project, whose main aim is to 
alleviate poverty. 
 
 
2.  METHODOLOGY 
 
This study utilized  the “before” and “after” framework of analysis.  The “before”  time 
frame refers to the period before the July 2002 vegetable importation.  The “after”  refers to 
the period after July 2002.  This  timeframe was chosen in this paper, as the dramatic effects 
of the liberalization of trade in agriculture was felt by farmers and other stakeholders of the 
vegetable industry after July 2002.   
 
Barangay Cattubo  was the focus of the study because of its long history (going back almost 
one century) of vegetable production and the level it reached in terms of commercial 
production.  Barangay Cattubo is also the site of certain  CHARM activities,   namely high 
value crops and cut-flower production,  
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Sampling   
 
A roster of farmers in Barangay Cattubo from the municipal agricultural office was the 
source from which farmer respondents in the barangay were selected.  The names  included 
in the sample were chosen on the basis of  the following criteria: they are residing in the 
community at the time of data collection,  they have farm lots in the barangay and were 
willing to be interviewed. Those who were not available for interview or did not want to be 
interviewed were replaced. 43 respondents were interviewed which represents 10 percent of 
the farmer population.  
 
Key people who could provide information on the overall farming situation, vegetable 
trading pattern, CHARM project’s services and project implementation were also 
interviewed.  
 
 
Data Gathering  
 
Primary data was obtained from the results of the survey done earlier by the researcher.  Key 
informant interviews and in-depth individual interviews with traders, selected farmers and 
CHARM project personnel were conducted.  Secondary data sources used were the Barangay 
Natural Resources Management Plan (BNRMP) prepared by the NGO component of the 
CHARM project in barangay Cattubo, other CHARM project documents, data from the  
Municipal Office and documents on vegetable importation by the  Anti-smuggling Task 
Force in the Cordillera region.   
 
 
3.  PROFILE OF BARANGAY CATTUBO 
 
 
General  
 
Barangay Cattubo is an indigenous peoples’ community.  It is one of the major producers of 
highland vegetables or what is popularly referred to as ‘Baguio vegetables’.  
 
It is one of the eight (8) barangays of the Municipality of Atok, province of Benguet.   It is 
located at the Northern part of the Municipality, sharing boundaries with Buguias on the 
North and Kabayan on the East, both of which are Municipalities of Benguet.  Barangay 
Pasdong and Madaymen, Kibungan bounds Cattubo on the west and Paoay bounds it on the 
south.  From Baguio City, the place can be reached after two and a half (2 ½) hours travel 
time. 
 
The research site for this study considered representative respondents from all the six  sitios 
of Barangay Cattubo, namely  Calasipan,  Apanbirang,  Timbac,  Tulodan,  Botiao, and  
Oyusan.   
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The barangay is located 55.6 kilometers from Baguio City, 49.5 kilometers from the 
Provincial capital of La Trinidad and 5.5 kilometers away from the Municipal hall at 
Sayangan.  Since the Halsema traverses the barangay, the area is accessible to all kinds of 
transportation facilities.  Buses plying the Bontoc-Cervantes, Lepanto and Buguias routes are 
available daily.    
 
The municipal office data recorded that Cattubo has a total land area of 2,414.12 hectares. A 
recent household survey recorded a population of 2,387 with 471 households. (CHARM-
BNRMP, 2002).   
 
The barangay lacks infrastructure services like electricity, water and access roads, so the 
majority of the households do not have electricity and water facilities.  The access roads are 
dilapidated and are passable only during the dry season.   
 
The barangay is basically an agricultural community that is oriented to cash crops 
production.  Fifty percent (50%) of the agricultural lands are not irrigated.  
 
Agriculture is the main source of income of the people who grow various ornamental and 
vegetable crops which they sell in Baguio and La Trinidad.  They also raise livestock and 
poultry but on a limited scale and these are usually for home consumption. 
 
 
People 
 
Most of  the population belong to the Kankana-ey and Ibaloi ethnolingustic groups, who are 
the original inhabitants of the community.  In 1998, Barangay Cattubo had a registered total 
population of 2,140 with 1,136 males and 1,004 females in 368 households (MHO’s Actual 
Survey).  Currently, it has a population of 2,387 and 471 households.  It is composed mainly 
of young people between 0-34 years old; there are 965 young dependents belonging to the 0-
14 age group, 1332 belonging to the labor force and 1,300 who are respectively active.  Only 
90 individuals belong to the 60-75 age group. 
 
There are three major languages spoken in the barangay, namely Kankaney, Ibaloi, and 
Ilokano.  Kankanaey dialect is the most spoken dialect of 1,205 households, Second is Ibaloi 
with 1,110 households; and Ilocano is the least dialect spoken in the barangay with 21 
households using it. 
 
 
Socio-economic and cultural situation 
 
Farming is the major source of income.  Major crops grown in the barangay are  cabbage, 
potatoes, carrots, green peas, radish and celery.    Off farm  activities  are small business 
enterprises such as repair shops, vulcanizing, restaurant and sari-sari stores. Other sources of 
income also include formal employment. Livestock and poultry are also grown generally for 
home consumption. Only a few households raise cow or cattle, carabaos, ducks, goats and 
geese. 
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Being a community of indigenous peoples, Cattubo still holds on to certain functional 
indigenous traditions and beliefs.  Despite the fact that Barangay Cattubo has been fully 
integrated into the market economy, it has managed to maintain certain indigenous socio-
economic and political  practices.  As a farming community that  engages in a highly labor 
intensive vegetable production, the gammal  or  aduyon, a form of mutual labor exchange  is 
still functional. Pakde, an indigenous ritual for good harvest  is still practiced especially 
when there is continuous crop failure.   The kapia or the belief that people should establish 
harmony not only with others but with nature and the spirit world  still finds its way into the 
lives of a significant number of the population.  The tongtong,  a traditional justice system 
and conflict resolution mechanism, likewise persists.   
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Sources of Income of Respondents  
 
Source Household 
Head 
Spouse Other 
Members 
Total 
Farm 387 266 23 675 
Off farm (Industry) 25 116  149 
Non farm (Prof) - 7 8 15 
 
 
 
 
Land Use and Classification 
 
Most (or 41%) of the land in Cattubo is used for agriculture, 17% is used as residential area; 
13 % as pasture land; 8% is categorized as institutional land and 6% is identified as rivers 
and creeks.  Almost all the active agricultural land is used for vegetable farming, with a little 
of the remainder planted with fruits.  The terrain of the area, which covers 2414 hectarres, is 
either hilly (40%) or mountainous (60%). 
  
 
Social Services 
 
Barangay Cattubo has 15 types of business establishments distributed in the 5 sitios of the 
barangay.  A business enterprise such as sari-sari store, 2 cooperative stores, a bakery and 2 
restaurants.  All business establishments except for the cooperative stores are privately 
owned. As for educational facilities in Cattubo, there are at least 3 Day Care Centers, 1 
primary school and 2 elementary schools.  All but Timbac Day Care Center are public 
institutions.  18 teachers are assigned in these public schools. It has only 1 Health Station 
located at Sitio Timbac.  However, the building is not being used because the midwife 
serving the whole barangay holds office at the Barangay hall at Sito Tulodan. 
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Vegetable gardening in the province started in late l930s after roads were constructed by a 
Turkish national named Cairus who was able to get a concession to log the forests. By 1946, 
a certain Alfredo Alumno, one of the first settlers in the sitio started vegetable gardening at 
Calasipan and he was the first to produce potatoes in the barangay in 1948.  That same year, 
a farmers’ organization was also formed to help in the marketing of vegetables to Manila.  It 
was also during this time that farmers started “terracing” the mountainsides to make them 
into  “uma’ (garden).  To improve literacy of children, Mr. Malameon established the 
Calasipan Elementary School and in 1952, adult education classes were also being conducted 
in the barangay.  The Tulodan Elementary School was only established year later in 1968. 
   
In 1955-1957 the road from Halsema to Tulodan was made and migrants from Pasdong 
started vegetable gardening at Calasipan, Oyusan, Timbac and Apanbirang.  It was also that 
time that Chinese migrants started to rent lands for vegetable gardening.The three important 
crops raised were white potato, cabbage and carrots.  Other crops grown are celery, Chinese 
cabbage, sweet potato, ornamental crops and gabi. 
 
 
Respondent’ profiles 
 
The study interviewed  43 respondents, which  constitute 10 percent of the population of 
farmers in barangay Cattubo.  The barangay  has a long history of  vegetable production for 
cash despite the limitations posed by the climatic and geographical terrain  as well as lack of 
basic social services like irrigation.  Table 7 provides information on the profile of the 
respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17
TABLE 7:  SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS 
 
 
CHARACTERISTICS NUMBER PERCENTAGE (%) 
SEX 
 Male 
 
23 
 
53.5 
 Female 20 46.5 
TOTAL 43                  100.0 
 
AGE (Years) 
  
 20 – 25 
 26 – 30 
 31 – 35 
 36 – 40 
 41 – 45 
 46 – 50 
 51 – 55 
 56 – 60 
 61 – 65 
2 
2 
6 
8 
6 
           12 
4 
2 
1 
4.6 
4.6 
                  13.9 
                  18.6 
                  13.9 
                  27.9 
9.3 
4.6 
2.3 
TOTAL 43 100 
 
CIVIL STATUS 
 Single 
 Married 
 Separated 
 Widow/Widower 
 
 
0 
           43 
0 
0 
 
 
- 
100 
- 
- 
TOTAL  43 100 
 
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
 No Schooling 
 Primary 
 Elementary Level 
 Elementary Grad 
 High School Level 
 High School Grad 
 College Level 
 College Grad 
 Vocational  
 
 
 
1 
1 
          10 
          13 
4 
8 
2 
3 
1 
 
 
 
2.3 
2.3 
                  23.2 
                  30.2 
9.3 
                  18.6 
4.6 
7.0  
2.3 
TOTAL  43 100 
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4.  CURRENT SITUATION AND RECENT TRENDS 
 
 
Current Situation 
 
Indigenous communities that have already been integrated into the cash economy experience 
have borne the harsh impacts of the liberalization of agriculture (Rovillos et. al., 2001).  This 
is illustrated in the case of the vegetable industry in Benguet where the high value crops 
which gained her the title “salad bowl” of the country may yet become a ‘sunset industry’ in 
the history of Philippine agriculture.  High value crops such as carrots, potatoes, asparagus, 
broccoli, cabbages, green onions, garden peas, lettuce, radish and cauliflower have always 
occupied the top priority list in the country’s agriculture department.  The potato, for 
example, has been promoted as a ‘banner crop’ in the region, even on the eve of the 
liberalization policy.  Yet with the liberalization policy, even the Department of Agriculture 
admitted that the same high value crops (potato, garlic, onion, and cabbage) are ‘threatened 
crops’ under the policy.  
 
In July 2002, the vegetable farmers were shocked when imported carrots swamped the 
Manila market. Immediately, 250,000 farmers in the province and some 400 traders at the 
local trading post in La Trinidad municipality felt the direct impact of vegetable importation.  
By August, the provincial government declared a ‘crisis’ in the industry.  Traders claim that 
the price of carrots dropped at a low P7 which is very unusual at a time when non-stop 
typhoons and monsoon normally trigger prices up. 
 
 
Trends in vegetable importation and smuggling 
  
The Philippines  is importing around 40  kinds of fresh/chilled/diced vegetables  and  about 
16 of these  are vegetables produced in  the Cordillera region, specifically Benguet province. 
These include cabbage, cauliflower, broccoli, potatoes, raddish, celery, lettuce, cucumber, 
asparagus, carrots, Chinese cabbage, beans, wongbok, sweet peas, chayote, bell 
pepper,cucmber,  to name a few.  A listing of some imported vegetables is shown in Table 8. 
 
The volume of importations is so voluminous as to far surpass the  total  production of local 
producers.  For instance, the onion-growing province of Pangasinan pegs 11,027 mt 
production compared to the 10,690 mt of imported onions from China in 2001.  Similarly, 
cauliflower and broccoli imported from Singapore in 2001 registered a 5,418 percent 
increase in volume from year 2000.  A 2,364 percent increase in the importation of cabbage 
from China between 200 and 2001 is also significant (Lacuarta, 2002).  
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Table  8:   Philippines:  Fresh Vegetable Imports, 2001-2002 (Volume in kilograms)  
 
 
 
Item 2001 2002 % 
Change 
Onions,  in 
quota 
16,476,168 6,602,175 (59.9) 
Other 
vegetables , 
n.e.s. 
129,579 1,814,076 1,300.0  
Cauliflowers 
& headed 
broccoli 
309,590 609,724 96.9 
Lettuce, other 
than sub-item 
0545401 
369,197 215,333 (41.7) 
Cabbage 
lettuce (head 
lettuce) 
84,917 171,186 101.6 
Cabbage, in-
quota 
35,742 69,422 94.2 
Onions, out-
quota 
1,163,750 50,000 (95.7) 
Asparagus 8,093 3,030 (62.6) 
Radishes 3,831 2,998 (21.7) 
Spinach, New 
Zealand 
spinach and 
orache spinach 
(garden 
spinach) 
1,074 2,647 146.5 
Beans (vigna 
spp., phaseolus 
spp.) 
1,617 1,579 (2.4) 
 
            
                    Source: National Statistics Office; and some data from Macabasco, 2002. 
 
  
The quantities of  imports of several vegetables have become so huge that in some cases they 
have exceeded the  total  production of local producers.  For instance, the onion-growing 
province of Pangasinan had 11,027 metric tonnes of production, compared to the 10,690 
metric tonnes of onions imported into the country from China in 2001.  Cauliflower and 
broccoli imported from Singapore in 2001 registered a 5,418 percent increase in volume from 
 20
year 2000.  A 2,364 percent increase in the importation of cabbage from China between 2000 
and 2001 is also significant (Lacuarta, 2002).  
 
At the regional level, the Task Force on Anti-smuggling, which closely monitors the entry of 
imported vegetables in four entry points in Manila, reported that there was a very significant 
rise in the volume of imported vegetables (both legally imported and smuggled) during the 
course of 2002.  (See Table 9). 
 
 
 
 
Table 9:  Total Monthly Volume of Imports (Legal/Smuggled Vegetables) for 2002 
 
 
 
Month                             Volume[Kgs] 
 
 
January 397,018 
February 542,522 
March 327,543 
April 446,696 
May 569,639 
June 396,872 
July 513,763 
August 1,100,914 
September 1,370,533 
October 958,165 
November 1,002,973 
December 424,208 
  
 ________________________________________________________________ 
Source: John Kim Files, (Municipal Councilor & Member, Task Force on Anti Smuggling) 
2002. 
 
 
As the Table shows data that has been gathered in only four entry points in Manila area, the 
figures probably understate the amount of imports.  The trend of rapid and sudden rise at the 
last months of the year is however very clear.   There was a doubling of imports from July to 
August, with the very high level continuing in September to November.     
 
Farmers and traders alike identified the government’s policy of liberalization of the 
agriculture sector as the main factor in this rapid increase in vegetable imports, which in turn 
caused the extremely low price levels.   
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A further complicating factor is the entry of illegally imported vegetables. Local officials in 
the province of Benguet,  Mountain Province and local officials elsewhere pointed out that 
the illegal entry of smuggled large volumes of vegetables  is another development which 
further weakened the vegetable industry.  Certainly, if one looks at the volume of  illegally 
imported vegetables, one can not ignore the fact that at particular months, smuggled 
vegetables  even surpassed the volume of legally imported ones.  This is very clear in the 
graphs below.  Note however that the data is taken from only four entry points of imports in 
Manila.  As Councilor John Kim of La Trinidad, in Benguet province said, the “entry of  
smuggled vegetables would spell death to vegetable farmers.”10  Kim is one of the most 
active members of the  Task Force on Anti-Smuggling, which monitors  certain entry points 
for illegally imported vegetables in Manila. 
 
 
 
                                                                   Chart 1 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source of basic data : Files of Councilor John  Kim of the  Task Force on Anti-Smuggling (Different 
importation dates, different importers in 4 entry points of vegetable imports namely Subic Port, 
Olongapo City, Manila International Container Port (MICP) – Port Area Manila,NAIA – Pasay, 
South Harbor – MICP  
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 This comment was made during the interview with him.  
 22
Price Trends 
 
Trends in the price of vegetables recorded a steep decline. The  monitoring groups reported  
that in November 2002, cabbages were being sold at  P1.50/kg compared to P10/kg a year 
ago;  Chinese cabbage at P2.50/kg; potatoes at P5/kg and carrots at P7/kg.   Normally, 
vegetables command better prices on holidays, however,  there was no significant price 
increase during the long Christmas break both in 2002 and 2003. On December 24, 2002  for 
instance, there was a sudden decrease in price.  By early January  of 2003, local traders 
interviewed  said that a repeat of the November 2002 price was being felt.  Lettuce which 
used to sell between  P60 to P80 per kilogram at this time of the year was selling an average 
of only P8/kg.  In the Christmas 2003 season, another repeat performance of December 2002 
was evident – only this time, the situation was even more pathetic. Truckloads of vegetables 
were lined up along the highway for days untouched and so were those which were just 
displayed in front of the trading post.  When the farmers were interviewed, they said that 
there would be no traders or wholesalers around. Normally it is during the Christmas break 
when the movement of vegetables in the market is busiest.  
 
Charts 2 and 3 show the prices of vegetables in 2000, 2001 and 2002, and reveal the extent of 
fluctuations in the prices.  It is noted that in 2002  there is steep and continuous decline in 
price.  For the four major crops grown in the research site,  for instance  potatoes,   better 
price  was seen in year 2000 that picked up between July and  August,  the season when  
‘jackpot’ price usually   happen and then picks up again starting November until January.  
Here, high  price levels were observed in December when  the price of potato went up as 
much as PhP31.26.  In a return of investment study done by the Highland Agricultural 
Resources Research and Development (HARRDEC) in 1999, it was concluded that when the 
price level  of potatoes is pegged at PhP20 a kilo, a 289% return on investment is realized.  
Obviously, the 31 peso price level  in December 2001 is already a jackpot price, so they say. 
The same is observed in 2001 where price increases were experienced starting in July until 
the holiday season in December. 
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Average Price Curve of Different Vegetablesfor the Year 2002  (La Trinidad Trading Post)
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Line Graph Showing the Price Trend of Cabbage Scorpio 
from 1999 - 2003 
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                                                               Chart 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: DA-CHARM Project-Agribusiness Unit.  2002.  
                                                
 
 
 
 
5.  IMPACT OF LIBERALIZATION  
 
This section discusses the impact of  globalization and liberalization on vegetable farmers in 
barangay Cattubo in the municipality of Atok, Benguet. 
 
 
(a)  Decreased incomes and sustained losses 
 
The cash flow in the household is usually a good indicator of the economic situation within a 
household . In the study,  the respondents were asked about their gross income per cropping 
‘before’  and ‘after’  the liberalization of vegetable imports.  As noted earlier, the ‘before’ time 
period covers the cropping calendar that is  prior to July 2002  and the ‘after’ period refers to  
August 2002 onwards.   As shown in Tables 10 and 11,  the highest gross income per cropping 
before importation is recorded at P225,000 with the lowest gross income of P2,500.  This is a far 
cry from the respondent’s estimated highest gross income after the vegetable importation which 
averaged at P75,000.00. 18 persons or 43% of the 42 respondents said that for the second half of 
2002 until the present, they experienced  income losses, as the prices of their vegetables were so 
low that for the last three croppings they could only get revenues to  cover 35% to 60% of their 
total expenses. Two of the respondents  claim they “broke even.”  Most of the respondents claim 
they went ‘bankrupt’ since year 2002 and that condition has persisted until the present.   
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TABLE  10:   Respondents’ Highest  Income Before and After Importation  
       Before Importation  After Importation 
                          n=42                                           n=42 
               Number     Percentage               Number             Percentage 
      (%)            (%) 
PhP  5,000-10,000    2   4.7   20  47.6 
      10,001-20,000   7 16.6   11  26.2 
      20,001-30,000   2   4.7     6    14.3 
       30,001-40,000   5          11.9                               4    9.5 
       40,001-50,000            10 23.8     - 
       50,001-60,000    -      - 
       60,001-70,000   5          11.9                               - 
       70,001-80,000   2            4.7                               1    2.4 
       80,001-90,000                        -                                                      - 
       90,001-100,000   2   4.7     - 
       100,001-110,000   3   7.1     - 
       110,001-120,000   1   2.4     - 
       120,001-130,000   2            4.7     - 
       130,001-150,000+       -                - 
       220,001-230,000   1            2.4               - 
          
TOTAL             42                            42 
 
 
 
TABLE  11:  Respondents’ Lowest  Income Before and After Importation  
       Before Importation  After Importation 
                      n=42                                                n=42 
          Number     Percentage               Number         Percentage 
      (%)         (%) 
 
Income loss     1     2.4   17      40.47 
Break-even         2       4.76 
PhP  5,000-10,000    10    23.8                10      23.80 
      10,001-20,000   13    30.9              11      26.19 
       20,001-30,000   14    33.3                2          4.76 
       30,001-40,000     2             4.8                            
       40,001-50,000    
       50,001-60,000 
       60,001-70,000    
       70,001-80,000     1             2.38                          1        2.38 
          
TOTAL    42     42 
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Many respondents also claimed that they are still paying previous loans incurred.  The prevailing 
system is that the capital for vegetable farms is dependent on loans.  Previous studies show that 
potato production for instance is debt-dependent since it is heavily capital-intensive.  This 
situation has become fertile ground for unethical marketing and lending practices. Loan sharks 
are waiting to pounce on farmers who desperately need capital.    
 
In spite of this situation, the farmers still continue producing, hoping that they will be able to hit 
the ‘jackpot price’.  ‘Jackpot price’ for farmers would mean profiting by more than double the 
investments.  Vegetable farming is considered to be  “tsamba-tsamba”  or a game of chance. 
You lose today but tomorrow if you are lucky you will hit the jackpot. A considerable number of 
rural farmers in the research site  continue investing in the industry,  expecting to at least recover 
from the crisis.   Two respondents intimated that they borrowed from their suppliers the second 
time around, even at a high risk , because they are still hoping that their luck will change. 
 
The data show that since the huge inflow of vegetable imports in July 2002, farm income has not 
been enough to meet the basic needs of the household. When asked what caused this, the  
respondents pointed to the vegetable importation. Three key informants said that before the 2002 
influx of imports, even if they went through a period where prices went down, the next cropping 
promises better prices and in their experience, almost always, income losses are offset in the next 
cropping seasons.  They also say that before, farmers can predict price fluctuations and they were 
able to master ways to cope with this. They said that at no time in the history of the vegetable 
industry did they go through such an experience where  prices were ‘abnormally low’ for more 
than a year up to the present.    They expressed the need to look for ‘alternative income sources’ 
but there is hardly any other option for them. Those who tried to look for other livelihood 
sources failed.   
 
These findings are consistent with the reported performance of the agriculture sector  by the 
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA)  for 2002 – which  highlighted a “negative 
3% in  performance of semi-temperate vegetables and fruits grown in Benguet and Mt. 
Province.”  (NEDA-RDR, 2002).  
 
 
(b)  Effects on the CHARM Project 
 
The key goal of the CHARM project  is to:  
“..increase average farm family incomes from about 21,200 11 to at least PhP56,000 by 
the year 2006 in real terms, and so reduce the number of families below poverty line in 
target municipalities from 33,000 households to about 12,000 households ( or from 70 
percent to not more than 25 percent).”(CHARM Proposal, 1995).   
 
 
                                                 
11
 In l995 US$1 was equal to PhP25 and so the conversion  for these amounts is that 21,200 pesos is $820 and 
56,000 is $2,170.  
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Project documents also show in their indicative survey that the average asset value of 28 
households surveyed is PhP16,100 and the average outstanding balance/borrowing  per 
household is PhP8,300.  The average household liability balance amounts to P12,400, which is 
roughly 40% of  annual income. Clearly, these households are debt-ridden.   
 
The CHARM project document concluded that the income flow is very inadequate to generate 
durable household assets, that is  lift the household beyond poverty.  (CHARM Project 
Document, Jan 1996).   The CHARM project interventions which should directly or indirectly 
result in an increase in incomes have in fact not succeeded.  Indeed, in this village about 60% of 
the farmer respondents claim they have not heard of or seen any CHARM project in their 
community.  
 
In other areas where CHARM has had more visibility, the farmers have shared the same fate 
after the importation of July 2002.  Although they may be a little bit better off compared to 
farmers in the other areas, they have also experienced adverse effects of the importation.  They 
also have left their vegetables to rot in the gardens or in the highways. The CHARM NGO 
component report of the Barangay Natural Resource Management Plan [BNRMP] in 2002 
reported a monthly family income of PhP2,000 to  PhP3,000 or a yearly average income of  
24,000 to 36,000, which is far below the CHARM project target of PhP56,000..  
 
 
(c) Production and Expenditure Patterns in Barangay Cattubo  
 
An analysis of the production-consumption patterns of Cattubo respondents shows that income 
derived from farming has to be allocated  between consumption expenditures and production and 
marketing costs. Production costs are usually met through loans from creditors. In a study 
conducted by the Cordillera Studies Center in selected  communities in the Cordillera region in 
1994,  it was  illustrated  that there is  an essential difference  between employment as a source 
of cash and farming as  a source of cash.  Cash  received from employment is disposable income 
which is allocated between  consumption expenditures and saving. In contrast, cash receipts of 
farming households from sales of produce have to meet both production/marketing costs and 
consumption expenditures (CSC, 1994).   
 
Other sources of income are essential, then, if  a farming household is to sustain itself.  In this 
study, it was revealed that  households that solely depend on farming are very vulnerable to the 
behavior of the market. Cash generated  from farming has to be allocated as capital for the next 
cropping, as current expenses on food, loan payments, education and health expenses, etc. In 
fact, food and capital for the next cropping compete with each other. Loan/debt payments have 
also been consistently identified as priority expenses.    Another problem articulated by the 
respondents is the  price increase in chemical inputs which had been skyrocketing.  A study 
conducted in 2000  on the  prices of commercial inputs in major farm suppliers  along the 
Halsema stretch reveals that the price increase ranged from 1% to 150%. (Sidchogan-Batani, 
2000). The Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority [FPA] admitted that agricultural input prices have 
increased, thus negating the promise of lower prices as a result of liberalization (Arao, 1999).   
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TABLE 12 :  Ranking by Respondents of Priority of Items of Household  Expenditures 
  
Respondent 
# 
food Clothing Shelter Health Agricultural 
inputs 
Education Lease 
of land/ 
land 
rentals 
Payment 
of loan 
interest 
Payment 
of labor 
cost 
investments Other 
expenses 
1 2 4 5  3 1      
2 1 4 7 3 2 6  5    
3 2 3 4  1       
4 1 3 4 6 2 5      
5            
6 2 6 7 5 1 3 8 4    
7 1 2  3 4       
8 2 5   3 4  1    
9 1 5   2  3 4   6(church) 
10 1    2 4  3    
11 1 3  2 5 4  6    
12 2 5  6 3 1  4    
13            
14 1 5 6 3 8 2 9  10 4 7(rain burst) 
15 1 6 2 5 4 8 3   7  
16 1 7 8 4 3 5  6  7 2(electricity) 
17 1 4 2 3 6 5 7 9 8 11 10(electric 
bills) 
18 1   3 5 2   4   
19 1    2       
20 2    1       
21 1    2 3  4    
22 1 6  4 3 2   5   
 
Source:  Data obtained from interviews with 22 of the respondents
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The situation for households with  ‘other sources’ of income like spouses having fixed income 
from employment,  show an expenditure pattern where items such as education and health are 
not affected.  Indeed, income derived from employment is ‘disposable income’  for consumption 
expenses and savings.   
 
The income of Cattubo respondents are low, to begin with.  For instance, data from the 
Municipal Agricultural Office show that the income ranges from P2001.to P3,000 (BNRMP, 
2001). 
 
 
(b) Inability to Compete 
 
The ability of the household to participate in the market as well as the ability to have access and 
control over commercial production inputs are very important in any  community integrated into 
the market economy.  Data reveal that both of these capacities have diminished in recent years.  
The farmer respondents used to market their products in La Trinidad Trading post and Baguio 
City, the nearest market outlets  for their vegetables. However, because of the drop in the prices 
of vegetables, the respondents say that on many occasions they were forced to dump their carrots 
and potatoes along the highway, or they just left their crops to rot in their vegetable farms.  The 
practice of allowing crops to rot on the field or to dump them along the highway en route to the 
market is common during periods of low prices, as transporting them to the market would mean 
more losses.  Farmers now talk nostalgically of ‘better times’ in the past, even when in these past 
times the farmers ended up as ‘price takers’ in the  complex and layered market chain. 
 
Respondents say that previously, even before their products would reach the trading post, they 
used to be intercepted by company or trader agents or  ‘harang boys’ who provided market 
information which they could use to negotiate for better prices.  At other times, where a supplier 
came in between the farmers and the market agents, the supplier  picks up  the product of the 
farmer and handles the marketing. The Benguet vegetable farmers, who are at the end of the 
complex market chain, admit that get very little profit in the marketing of their products.  They 
have been at the mercy of middlepersons and the Chinese syndicates who are in control of the 
vegetable markets in Baguio and in Manila.     
 
After July 2002, things have become worse.  The continuing existence of this almost century-old 
industry is seriously threatened by import liberalization. There are more frequent scenes of 
vegetables being dumped along the major highways in the province.  Piles of vegetables are 
stacked up along the highway, with neither agents, traders nor even suppliers to be found.   
 
The experience cited earlier during the recent Christmas season (2003), when  filled-up vegetable 
trucks were lined up for days near the entrance of the trading post, unattended to, is an indicator 
of the gravity of the situation.  Immediately after July 2002, when the import liberalization took 
place, about 400 traders at the local trading post in La Trinidad municipality, the nearest 
vegetable trading complex for vegetables, publicly expressed their anger. Around 250,000 
vegetable farmers in the province were facing a very unanticipated and uncertain situation. By 
August 2002, the provincial government of Benguet declared that there was a ‘crisis’ in the 
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vegetable industry.  Since then, the movement of vegetables in the market slowed down or even 
intermittently stopped. 
 
Two of the 42 respondents who seem to have thorough knowledge about the  ‘liberalization 
policy in agriculture’  say  they  no longer expect good or even fair prices for their produce, as 
imported vegetables are sold at a much cheaper price compared to the locally produced 
vegetables.  The respondents were quick to add, however,   that locally produced vegetables are  
‘safer to eat, and more delicious.’  Indeed, price monitoring of imported vegetables reveal that 
their prices are 30 to 50 per cent cheaper than locally produced vegetables (Business World, 
2002).     
 
Table 13 and Chart 4 show that in recent years, the prices of vegetables have steadily gone down.  
To this, the farmers say, “makapa-awan ganas” and  “kasasadut” or there is no more 
incentive/enthusiasm to plant again. In fact, five of the respondents no longer planted for the last 
two croppings and gave the reason that with a prolonged price crisis brought about by 
importation, it is no longer viable to  plant vegetables.  Another respondent say that before, his 
attitude was to keep on planting, high or low price – with the end view that  at one cropping or 
another, he will chance  upon a ‘jackpot price.’  Today, this farmer says he is not hoping 
anymore as  prices are no longer ‘fluctuating’ but  are  consistently dropping.   
 
Interview data with a former Syngenta Marketing Specialist cited that their company, in an effort 
to maintain its sales of farm inputs to vegetable farmers, conducted a feasibility study of linking 
farmer-clienteles of Atok and Buguias  to possible consumers in the Manila market. The 
conclusion reached is that this  ‘Market Links’ scheme  is not feasible.  This is because Benguet  
farmers,  can not assure the volume, speed and quality requirements.  He further added that these 
farmers being linked with the Manila market, are even the big and wealthy and ‘most favored’  
farmers of  Benguet. 
 
One can already see that the  importation of vegetables bring about ‘exclusion’ of small, even big 
farmers as they can no longer  meet the market demands.   Perhaps, this is the reason why  
Secretary Lorenzo of the Department of Agriculture, during the  Regional Vegetable Congress in 
November 2003,  emphasized this point when he  pointed out  that “in a competitive world, one 
needs to be exact… otherwise, we get eased out in the process.”   
 
Highland vegetables used to be competitive in the market.  A case in point is the potato which is 
one cash crop which has been considered to be a competitive  rootcrop both in the developing 
and developed countries.  In the Philippines, potato farmers grossed PhP111,648 per hectare with 
an average  net income  of PhP40,299 per hectare or a net profit of  PhP0.92 for every peso of 
investment (Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, 1996).   This is the reason why potato was declared 
as one of the so-called key commercial crops  for the country’s Department of Agriculture 1993-
1998 Medium Term Agricultural Development Plan and was again promoted as a priority 
national commodity under the Key Commercial Crop Development  Program (KCCDP) and a 
‘banner crop’ in the Cordillera region in year 2000. This is not the case now.   
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Table 13:  Major Crops Grown  in Barangay Cattubo Showing Price Trend  As Against Volume Imported (2000-2003) 
 
Commodity 2000 2001 2002               2003 
Volume 
[Kgs] 
Ave.Price 
[in Pesos] 
Volume 
[Kgs] 
Ave.Price 
[in Pesos] 
Volume 
[Kgs] 
Ave.Price 
[in Pesos] 
Volume 
[Kgs] 
Ave.Price 
[in Pesos] 
Carrots 89,836 16.84 31,956 13.90 646,966 12.93  11.79 
Celery 17,140 31.84 24,105 18.00 5,511 24.50  10.14 
Potato 40,301,438 16.86  18.327  12.57  8.65 
Cabbage 21,526 16.32 35,742 13.73 69,422 19.13  9.24 
Radish 2,767 5.75 3,831 16.42 2,998 5.50  3.70 
 
Source of basic data is National Statistics Office  
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                                                                                       Chart 4 
 
 
 
Source of raw data: DA-CHARM Agri-business Unit. 2002 
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Table 14:   Monthly Average Wholesale Buying Price of Highland 
Vegetables (2002)       
 
       
 
     
       
 
     
Commodity January February March April May June July August September October November December 
Cabbage Scorpio 6 8.88 12.81 6.28 9.21 14.1 13.02 18.15 14.08 14.42 6.25 5.39 
Cabbage RB 4 6.31 10.6 4.21 6.18 10.8 10.91 15.9 11.6 12.22 5.24 3.59 
Potato 16 12.36 10.93 12.54 16.48 13.98 14.13 11.75 12.41 11.32 8.82 10.19 
Wongbok 3 5.04 7.30 6.08 6.53 11.23 12.63 15.8 5.98 3.69 3.78 4.08 
Carrots 6.95 8.70 8.98 9.58 14.36 16.60 25.86 16.25 11.80 10.22 13.35 12.50 
Baguio Beans 9.21 10.71 10.50 14.88 20.89 9.36 18.16 20.20 12.38 8.36 13.35 12.50 
Sweet Peas – Chinese 29 35.75 28.45 36.11 55.00 41.00 49.13 86.45 60.13 43.47 39.47 43.38 
Sweet Peas – Lapad 17 19.98 20.48 25.50 37.17 23.39 35.38 73.68 51.45 30.56 22.29 21.06 
Celery 13 8.80 10.36 9.00 13.00 24.93 47.80 64.45 30.63 13.26 24.29 34.53 
Chayote 4.10 3.91 4.61 4.32 4.82 2.01 4.19 6.95 1.18 0.84 1.74 2.48 
Cauliflower – Benguet  8.52 12.66 8.40 9.44 8.00 14.28 30.50 33.43 27.98 21.69 11.97 10.50 
Cauliflower – Vigan   9.29 4.00          
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(c) Decreased Access to Resources 
  
In terms of capital, farmers are categorized as medium to big farmers when they are able to 
finance  their own production  and “small  farmers” are those that depend on loans to generate 
produce.  The profile of respondents show that almost all of them are considered as “small 
farmers.”  Most of them take part in the pa-suplay   scheme, which is an informal credit system 
that binds a financier (so-called ‘supplier’) and a farmer (who is being ‘supplied’).  The suppliers 
include fellow farmers (farmer-suppliers), farm produce disposers at the trading post, relatives 
who may have attained successes in their own farms, or vegetable agents who own vehicles, and 
other financial lenders who manage commercial farm input businesses in nearby municipalities.  
 
The movement of cash resources through the  pa-suplay  scheme was a normal phenomenon in 
small farm communities like Barangay Cattubo – until the importation of vegetables.  Today, 
capital is no longer as accessible as before. At the onset of vegetable importation, 27 (or 64%) of 
the respondents claim that they can no longer renew the supplier-supplied relationship even if 
collaterals are offered since previous loans have not been settled and the suppliers themselves no 
longer have surplus resources for lending. Even the other 8  (or  19%) of the respondents who 
were able to borrow once, were no longer able to renew their loans, though part of the reason is 
they are now apprehensive about borrowing.   Before the importation, however, their ‘suppliers’ 
were more aggressive in taking risks by renewing the loan even if previous loans are not yet 
paid.  After the importation, however, the movement  of financial resources seems to have 
stopped. 
. 
 
TABLE  15:     Number of Times Respondents availed of loans  
Number  of times      Before Importation  After Importation                            
loaned                                                       n=43     n=43 
     Number     Percentage               Number    Percentage 
      (%)         (%) 
Never          11           29 
Once       12                                        8 
Twice                                                      7                                        2 
Thrice                                                      5            
Four times                                               4                                              
Five times                                               1 
Always                                                    3            2 
                                                
TOTAL                 43                                      40 
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TABLE  16:    Respondents’ Major Source of Income 
 
Source  of               Before Importation                              
Income                                                   n=43                     
      
Vegetable Farming            43 
Por dia            13 
Formal Employment                                    2    
Laborer                                                        5 
                                                
TOTAL           63* 
 
* Total is higher than number of persons due to multiple responses 
 
 
 
 Table 17:  Other Sources of Income of the Household 
________________________________________________________________ 
Source 
          Number     
               
Livestock raising      1 
Business (store)                                   2 
Barangay Tanod                                  2 
Barangay Kagawad                             2 
Kontrata                                               8 
Toy making                                         1 
 
TOTAL                                                16 
 
 
 
 
When crops fail, a ready alternative source of income is the  por dia (daily waged labor).  The 
practice of resorting to por dia  is common, prior to the  importation of vegetables.  This is 
because for immediate purchases like food and kitchen needs, the respondents always resort to 
engaging in piecework, daily wage, or contract work for ready cash. The makipordia   usually, a 
woman’s domain, as one adaptable strategy after crop failure, worked well for some. However, 
for other respondents they do not see this as permanent solution but a temporary one to fill the 
gap especially for food needs.  As one woman respondent stated, “ta wada adi di ipakan ko sin 
pamilyak”  (to have money for food for the family).   
 
Today, however, with the vegetable importation and the persistence of  low price for highland 
vegetables, members of  farm households who used to sell  their labor through por dia  no longer 
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find it easy to do so since every one seems to be limiting the outflow of their own cash resources.  
To make matters worse, the absence of other skills and absence of a high-school diploma make it 
more difficult for them to find other livelihoods.  The harshness of the climate in the research site 
is another limitation.  Root crops can be planted, and five of the respondents allot certain parcels 
of their lands for  sweet potato and taro. However, because of the very cold climate, the harvest 
comes only once a year.  The planting of root crops as an alternative to rice therefore is said to be 
insignificant. 
 
Respondents with spouses or children who have formal  employment other than farming tend to 
have easier access to resources like capital hence do not need to borrow from financiers.  The  
importance of the households having “other sources of income”  can not be overemphasized.  As 
shown in Table 18, five of the respondents have household members who are employed – one is 
an overseas contract worker, the other two have spouses and children working as teachers, 
respectively;  another has a spouse working  as a staff of the provincial government,  another has 
a spouse working as a local government official  and the other is a storeowner that is a family 
enterprise.    For this group of respondents, the availability of disposable incomes seemed to 
encourage them to stick on to farming.   
 
 
(d) Food Insecurity, Diminishing Health  and Education  Expenditures    
 
 
The  social effects of the  decreased in  income  are seen in the  Table 19.  of  rural  households.  
Barangay Cattubo is not a rice farming community – hence it buys its rice supply outside.  This 
means that if cash runs short, food  runs out. Table 13 on the ranking of budget allocation based 
on priority expenditures shows that food and commercial farm inputs compete with each other. 
 
If a household allocates more budget for food, then there is less cash allocated for  other items 
like health and education.  This is found to be true in this case study as it was found that  
education and health was sacrificed.  While this phenomenon might have been present  with or 
without importation of vegetables,  it was clearly  pointed out by the respondents that  due to the 
instability of income caused by the surge in vegetable imports,  education is all the more 
sacrificed.  Table 19 shows that about a fourth of the respondents claim they will no longer  send 
their children to school next school year; while  five respondents claim their children  already 
dropped out from schooling since the previous  school year.  
 
The main reason provided by respondents for the increased incidence of children skipping 
schooling is that they have been facing increased financial difficulties ever since the import surge 
in vegetables.  Data at the  regional level  corroborates the above scenario in barangay Cattubo.  
The share of the poorest families to total income and expenditures has not improved between 
1988 and 2000.  In 1988, families belonging to the first to 4th deciles (i.e. the poorest) had shares 
of total regional income and expenditures which were were  only 17% and 19% respectively. By 
2000, these shares  further decreased to 13% and 17% respectively.   Moreover, some 100,698 
families live below the poverty threshold and some 49,573 families still live below subsistence.  
(NEDA-RDR, 2002).    
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TABLE 18:   Answers of Respondents as to whether they send school-age household members to 
school before and after vegetable import surge 
 
Answer                               Before Importation  After Importation                                                                                  
n=43                                     n=43 
     Number     Percentage               Number    Percentage 
      (%)         (%) 
Yes              30         70                            23                   53 
No                                          13         30                            20                   47 
 
                  TOTAL                              43                                         43                                 
 
 
 
 
TABLE  19:    Reasons Why Respondents stopped sending their children to school. 
 
Reasons                              Before Importation  After Importation                                                                                  
n=13   n=20 
     Number     Percentage               Number    Percentage 
      (%)         (%) 
No money              3             23         5     25 
Income is not enough              5             38                         7     35 
Decrease in family income                5             38                         8                  40 
                  TOTAL                          13                                        20 
 
 
 
The quantifiable  indicator set by the CHARM project on the other hand was quite  different.  
The project states that the number of families living below poverty line in target municipalities  
will be reduced from “33,000 households to 12,000 households .”   (Sunstar, 1997; Zigzag, 1997, 
CHARM Proposal 1995).  Local dailies cited this quantification as a result of the government’s 
Minimum Basic Needs [MBN] survey which pegged the monthly income for a family of six 
 
This grim picture in the  education sector is similarly reflected in the expressed view that 
expenditure for health and wealth is secondary in the listing of priorities, since earnings from the 
farms are saved as capital for the next cropping, while money for food needs as well as education 
and health have to be earned elsewhere.   
   
The data show that a majority of the respondents claim that they have consulted  health care 
providers at one time or the other [doctors in nearby public hospital including the city of Baguio, 
nurse and midwives].  Upon closer look, however, data show that farm inputs and food needs are 
priority items for the household.   Further  investigation gave the  information that health and 
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wealth ‘savings’ are sidelined as second or third priorities so long as  they have ‘farm needs’ and 
food provision for the family.  The “farm needs” include pesticides and farm equipment 
 
 
 
 
D.  CASE STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION AND TRADE 
LIBERALIZATION ON THE POULTRY INDUSTRY IN ALAMINOS, LAGUNA 
PROVINCE 
1. OBJECTIVE OF STUDY 
 
The objective of this case study is to ascertain the impact of globalization and trade liberalization 
on the poultry industry in the Philippines, and the effects of globalization on the  economic life 
of a rural poultry producing community in Alaminos, Laguna.  Specifically, this study aims to: 
1) Ascertain the extent to which changes in the production standards have eroded the 
traditional dominance of backyard, free-range poultry farming engaged-in by 
smallholders and how economic benefits have shifted to the integrators, big 
traders and contract growers. 
2) To determine how employment has been affected by this shift. 
3) To document the impact of the liberalization of the poultry industry on the 
different players in the sector and see whether globalization and trade 
liberalization has mitigated rural unemployment and poverty. 
 
 
Table 20:  Production of Chicken compared with other Major Agriculture Products  
(‘000 Metric Tonne), 1997-2001 
 
ITEM 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001P 
Coconut 13,707.8 12,806.4 12,505.0 12,994.7 13,207.8 
Sugarcane 22,273.1 17,333.4 23,777.8 24,491.0 24,961.7 
Banana 4,407.7 4,106.7 4,570.6 4,929.6 5,060.8 
Pineapple 1,616.1 1,575.1 1,565.9 1,559.6 1,617.9 
Coffee 130.0 122.2 117.4 126.3 132.1 
Mango 990.2 994.0 866.2 848.3 884.3 
Corn 4,332.4 3,823.2 4,584.6 4,511.1 4,525.0 
Chicken 929.7 919.4 929.2 997.8 1,098.8 
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, Department of Agriculture 
P
 Preliminary 
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2. THE PHILIPPINE POULTRY INDUSTRY  
 
After the accession of the Philippines to the WTO and the lifting of quantitative restrictions, 
importation of frozen chicken, mostly from the United States, went up dramatically.    Frozen 
chicken importation reached a new high of 29,000 tons in 1999.  It went down to 11,000 tons in 
2001 when the poultry farmers protested. The 2002 importation figure of 16,529 tons was highly 
understated, according to the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, since USDA (US Department of 
Agriculture) figures estimated about 24,000 tons. 
 
The Philippines has experienced a scaling-up of poultry production in the past ten years.  There 
is a steady increase in broiler production peaking at 46 million heads in 1997 and 1998. Broiler 
production slowed down to 29 million heads.and broiler production slowed down to 29 million 
heads.Broiler production slowly picked up registering 38 million heads in 2003. (See Table 23 
below).   Production of native/improved variety has been growing, from 46 million heads in 
1990 to a peak of 79 million in 1998, then falling to 72 million in 2003.   
 
 
 
Table 21:   .Total Chicken Inventory By Year and Type 
 
YEAR BROILER 
LAYERS NATIVE/ TOTAL 
(Foreign Strain) IMPROVED CHICKEN 
  
        
1990 26,564,599000 9,813,580000 45,923,946000 82,302,125000 
1991 24,529,060000 8,330,386000 45,380,505000 78,239,951000 
1992 27,355,852000 7,406,458000 46,762,901000 81,525,211000 
1993 31,172,690000 8,601,539000 47,383,290000 87,157,519000 
1994 34,771,286000 8,342,140000 50,087,583000 93,201,009000 
1995 27,884,979000 9,364,485000 58,966,260000 96,215,724000 
1996 39,311,760000 10,795,977000 65,674,658000 115,782,395000 
1997 46,558,072000 11,465,905000 76,938,831000 134,962,808000 
1998 46,386,171000 13,169,673000 78,964,816000 138,520,660000 
1999 32,719,546000 13,366,526000 67,702,965000 113,789,037000 
2000 29,023,771000 14,913,360000 71,249,850000 115,186,981000 
2001 28,958,552000 14,866,005000 71,781,960000 115,606,517000 
2002 33,149,459000 16,775,260000 75,805,374000 125,730,093000 
2003 38,148,017000 17,706,026000 72,340,040000 128,194,083000 
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, Department of Agriculture 
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Overall, chicken production posted upward swings.  Habito, quoting Rosegrant of IFPRI in 
Washington (Habito 2002) attributes this to the trend towards increased consumption of meat 
and meat products in developing countries in Asia.  One impetus in the scaling-up of poultry 
production was the dumping of cheap, subsidized feed grains (corn, wheat, soya) to developing 
economies.  The demand for feed grains has also increased, and with this, the importation of 
corn, wheat and soya beans, largely from the US. 
 
 
 
3.  THE POULTRY INDUSTRY IN ALAMINOS, LAGUNA 
 
The town12 
 
Alaminos is a fourth class municipality of the province of Laguna as at current classification.  It 
is an agricultural town with 93 % of its agricultural land planted with coconut interspersed with 
other fruit bearing trees—mostly rambutan and lanzones, and some root crops.  It is a heart-
shaped town bounded on the north by the towns of Calauan and Bay, on the south by Lipa City, 
Batangas, on the west by San Pablo City and on the east by Sto. Tomas, Batangas.  The town is 
about 70-80 kilometers from Manila passing through the Daang Maharlika (Maharlika 
Highway).  It has fifteen barangays or barrios, four of which are classified as urban barangays. 
 
Four rivers drain Alaminos.  It has a very low water table making extraction difficult, especially 
in the dry season.  This explains why rice is not grown in the town.  A few farmers engage in 
non-commercial corn production.  The town has an estimated population of 39,000.  With a 
population growth rate of not more than 3% per annum, the town’s rate lags behind the average 
growth rate of the province. 
 
Migration contributes significantly to the town’s small population growth rate.  Hemmed in by 
two well-developed cities and by the more advanced towns of Calauan and Sto. Tomas, the more 
enterprising members of the population prefer to seek better opportunities in these adjoining 
cities and towns, or go directly to the National Capital Region which is just 70-80 kilometers 
away. 
 
The main economic activity of the people of Alaminos is coconut production but since the town 
lacks the facilities and technology to process coconut into copra, coconuts are sold fresh to 
traders outside of the town or to processing companies in the adjoining cities and towns. 
 
People in the town attribute the relative prosperity presently enjoyed by a significant number of 
households to migration of family members to Spain, as teachers or domestic help.  The poultry 
industry does not seem to register as a veritable source of economic gain for the town and its 
people except for minimal real estate taxes, and taxes paid for by contract growers, also minimal. 
Historical development of the poultry industry 
 
                                                 
12
 Information from the Comprehensive Land Use and Development Plan of the Municipality of Alaminos, Laguna. 
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The poultry industry in Alaminos began with backyard poultry production, similar to what went 
on in other parts of the country, going back to even the pre-World War II period.  Individual 
household raisers used native stocks.  Feeding was free-range.  The industry developed under a 
natural economy whose individual producers focused on producing food for the household. The 
remainder was allocated for food stock, for barter and for occasional cash transactions to 
purchase matches, table sugar, edible oil, and other stuff needed in the household.  Family 
members usually shared and divided labor equally among them.  The whole family was 
productively engaged in the enterprise with the exception of children still incapable of 
contributing work.  Wealthier families engaged in bigger volume production but the practice did 
not spur commercialization since majority of the households also engaged in the same enterprise 
with varying intensities. 
 
This backyard, free-range system still goes on today but apparently much diminished, practiced 
mainly by the eleven rural barangays for food augmentation. 
 
 
 
The emergence of commercial poultry farming in Alaminos 
 
With the advent of the fast foods industry in the late 1960s came the exposure of Filipino 
consumers to fast foods and the eventual shift in food preference for meat and meat products, 
particularly broiler chicken.  But it was in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when fast foods 
mushroomed around the Philippines, that great demand for chicken developed.  The increased 
demand for chicken sent the various big players, the integrators, helping to set up poultry farms 
for would-be contract growers or transforming existing farms into the contract growing setup.  It 
was in this period that commercial poultry contract growing was introduced in Alaminos. 
 
The landed section of the population were able to take advantage of the opportunity, using their 
properties for loan collaterals in the four rural banks and one commercial bank serving the 
community.  The ownership of the commercial farms have not shifted significantly through the 
years and remain practically at the hands of those who started in the business.  Occasional new 
names that appear in the registered list usually are renting facilities from the original contract 
growers. 
 
In 1998, prior to the glut in the market due to increased importation of chicken and chicken parts 
from the US, Alaminos had 31 registered commercial poultry farms.  Presently it has 27 
registered commercial poultry farms.  Twenty one of these farms grow broilers and two maintain 
layers.  The remaining four farms are engaged in breeders.  (See Table 22).  
 
The table shows that the contract growing business in Alaminos is dominated by a few families.  
These are families and individuals with real estate properties and with access to financial 
institutions. 
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Table 22:   Poultry Commercial Farms in Alaminos, as at January 2003 
 
 Name of Farm Farm Location 
Poultry 
Population* Species 
Farm Size 
(Hectare) 
1 Jovita Bigal Farm San Benito 10,0000000 Broiler 0.70000 
2 FD Poultry Farm San Roque 10,0000000 Broiler 1.50000 
3 Najib Tumanes Farm San Roque U Broiler 0.20000 
4 FG Farm San Roque 10,0000000 Broiler 4.60000 
5 Belen Farm San Gregorio 37,5000000 Broiler 0.50000 
6 Bondad Farm Del Carmen U Broiler 1.00000 
7 Sergio Agra Farm Palma 25,0000000 Broiler 1.60000 
8 Melycen Faylona Farm Palma 15,0000000 Broiler 1.00000 
9 Rudy Cordero Farm Palma 10,0000000 Broiler 1.30000 
10 Gerry Faylona Farm Palma 10,0000000 Broiler 0.50000 
11 Carolyn Faylona Farm Palma 30,0000000 Broiler 1.70000 
12 Tony Gallivo Farm Brgy. III 20,0000000 Broiler U 
13 Melitonia Faylona Farm Brgy. III 45,0000000 Broiler 2.00000 
14 Armando Faylona Farm Brgy. III 15,0000000 Broiler 3.00000 
15 Ramon Sarmiento Farm San Ildefonso 68,0000000 Broiler 1.00000 
16 Lito Cubillejo Farm Sta. Rosa 1,5000000 Layers 3.40000 
17 Antonio Gallivo San Miguel 50,0000000 Layers 9.00000 
18 Teodoro Tolentino San Miguel 40,0000000 Broiler 1.00000 
19 Rolando Tolentino San Miguel 45,0000000 Broiler 2.40000 
20 Marcel Tolentino San Miguel 50,0000000 Broiler 1.70000 
21 Jessie Banzuela San Miguel 20,0000000 Broiler 1.00000 
22 Ramon Sarmiento San Andres 10,0000000 Breeder 0.80000 
23 Virgilio Monzones San Andres 15,0000000 Breeder 1.70000 
24 Edgardo Banzuela San Andres 40,0000000 Broiler 0.25000 
25 Conrado Masa San Andres 60,0000000 Broiler 2.5000 
26 Maynard Monzones San Andres 10,0000000 Breeder 2.00000 
27 Wilfredo Monzones San Andres 10,0000000 Breeder 0.50000 
 
Source: Municipal Agricultural Office, Alaminos, Laguna. 
Note: U—Undisclosed 
* Figures on poultry population were taken from existing loads of farm respondents/owners at 
the time of interview and do not reflect their actual loading capacities nor their annual volume 
production. 
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The operation of contract growing poultry farms in Alaminos 
 
The main players in this contract growing industry are the integrators and the contract growers as 
their junior partners.  Minor players are the “viajeros,” small and medium independent 
producers, and small backyard, free-range growers.  Feed grains wholesaler and retailers also 
figure in the equation, but as minor players, catering to small, independent or backyard raisers.  
Occasionally, contract growers patronize the local grains wholesaler and retailer when they run 
out of feeds.    
 
The Chart is a diagrammatic representation of the structure of the transactions between and 
among the players in the industry. 
 
The roles and relationships between the players and the steps in the chain of activity are shown 
in the Chart and described below, with the numbers below referring to the numbers in the chart13.    
 
1. Integrator loads contract grower; provides feeds and veterinary services. 
 
2. Eggs are harvested by Integrator and pays the contract grower. 
 
3. Integrator loads contract grower; provides feeds and veterinary services. 
 
4. Eggs are harvested and collected by Integrator; pays the contract grower. 
 
5. Eggs from breeders are hatched and DOC provided to contract growers; provides feeds 
and veterinary services. 
 
6. Broilers are harvested by Integrator; pays the contract grower 
 
7. Integrator sells to distributors, HRI, and wholesale buyers aside from conducting their 
own distribution to institutional buyers. 
 
8. Broilers and table eggs finally find their way into various markets and consumers 
 
9. What remains of the 90% to 95% take of the Integrator reckoned from the original broiler 
population is sold by the contract grower to viajeros (traders) for his own use as 
incentive, on top of his agreed cash share per head from the final broiler population 
 
10. Viajeros, independent producers and backyard farmers sell directly to wet markets. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
  Information here and in the Chart was obtained through interviews with contractors. 
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Chart 5:   Roles and Processes involving the Players in the Poultry Industry  
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The integrator loads each contract growers a quantity from 5,000 to 100,000 birds depending on 
the capacity and performance record or efficiency of the contract grower, based on criteria set by 
the integrators.  Regardless of the type of birds the contractor grows (which the integrator also 
determines), i.e., breeder, broiler, or layer, the common practice of integrators is to load  the 
contract grower; provide the feeds for the duration of the 38-day contract; and assign veterinary 
doctors for weekly checks and weighing of the birds.  Medicines and vitamin supplements are 
put on the account of the contract growers. 
 
The integrator’s share in the total production output is 90%-95% of the initial population.  The 
contract grower is tied by agreement to the integrator to achieve a minimum live weight of 1.5 
kilograms per bird. 
 
Depending on the performance of the contract grower, the integrator pays the contract grower 
from PhP5.00 to PhP12.00 per bird harvested, on top of the contract grower’s take of whatever 
birds are left after the integrator’s harvest. 
 
In the event the contract grower fails to meet the requirements, the integrator slaps the contract 
grower with a fine, called ‘payback’ by the contractors, the amount of which is equivalent to the 
difference between the expected total weight (90% initial population x 1.5 kgs) and the actual 
total weight of final population.  The severity of the fine is proportionate to the gravity of the 
deviation from the standards. 
 
The contract grower, on the other hand, hires workers on a per load or per batch basis.  Each 
worker is paid a minimum of PhP3,000 for the duration of the contract (38 days).  When the 
harvest is good, each worker can be given additional pay of as high as PhP4,000.  The standard 
hiring ratio is one worker per 5,000 birds.  In some cases, this goes up to one worker to 10,000 
birds.  In the breeder and layer farms, the average hiring ratio is one worker per 2,000 birds.  
There is also a difference in the duration of contract.  Workers in the breeder and layer type 
farms have longer term employment because of longer cycles for such types of farm.  Interviews 
with farm hands in one such farm revealed that workers have been hired continuously for years 
on end even as they remained contract workers receiving the same remuneration, with free living 
quarters and free meals.  
 
The average load per contract grower is 30,000 Day-Old-Chicks (DOCs).  The average number 
of loads per year per farm is five.  Therefore, broiler farms have an average volume production 
of 150,000 per year.  The combined production output of the twenty one broiler farms is 
3,150,000 broilers per year.  The combined number of workers from the twenty seven 
commercial farms averages 200. 
 
During peak seasons, like the Christmas and New Year period, loads are doubled or even trebled. 
Just before the holiday season, most of the contract growers with sufficient facilities were given 
loads of 80,000 DOCs each.  Hiring of workers has consequently doubled.  Presently, loads are 
back to the average 30,000 to 40,000 DOCs for broiler farms. 
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The local feed grains retailers, while playing a very minimal role in the commercial poultry farm 
activities, had also enjoyed increased sales during the peak season as the contract growers also 
had to source from them extra feed grains. 
 
 
Basic features of the poultry industry in Alaminos 
 
Described below are some of the basic features of the poultry industry in Alaminos. 
 
The dominant mode is contract growing, averaging an annual output of 3,150,000 broilers.  
Figures for breeders and layers are currently unavailable. An interview with a breeder farm 
owner, however, suggests that breeder farming is on the rise.  His own farm is already slated for 
an increase in breeder stock to 100,000 first month of 2004 from a low of 35,000 in January 
2003. 
 
The dominant player is the integrator.  He holds the sole decision making power in his relations 
with contract growers in the matter of loading volume and frequency; efficiency and sanitary 
standards; minimum weight per bird; feeds; minimum breeder eggs or layer eggs production per 
batch;  and the brand or species of birds. 
 
Backyard farms are located principally in ten rural barangays and the volume production varies 
widely from a low of 5 heads of native chicken to a high of 50 birds (separate interviews with 
backyard poultry raisers).  Those raising fifty heads and above have to provide makeshift cages 
for the birds.  There is no distinction between layers, broilers and breeders in backyard 
production of native chicken.  Hence, even assuming that all the 6,500 households in Alaminos 
engaged in backyard raising of 50 birds in two annual batches, the total annual production output 
would only be (6,500 x 50 x 2) = 650,000 birds.  And these numbers will be distributed 
randomly as table food, as breeders and as layers. 
 
The share of local feed grain stores in the feed requirements of the commercial poultry farms is 
negligible and contingent only on the chance that contract growers run out of feed stocks 
supplied by the integrator.  This was revealed by an interview with a feed grain store owner.  
Local feed grain stores combine feed grain sale with rice trading and sale of other perishable and 
non-perishable stuff.  The share of feed grain sales in the gross revenue is from 20% to 30%.  
The bulk comes from the sari-sari store and rice trading.  Hence, feed grain sale is treated as 
supplementary to the agricultural sari-sari store operation.  This explains why their businesses 
remain viable despite the fact that they are not the main source for feed stock of the commercial 
poultry farms.  These feed grain stores are the main source of feed grains for small, independent 
raisers.  However, this economic symbiosis between small, independent raisers and the local feed 
grains stores comes within the ambit of the feed millers who are the ultimate source of feed 
grains, hence they are also vulnerable to the volatility of the feed grains market. 
 
The municipal government is a passive player.  It collects real estates taxes from contract 
growers whose lands are classified as agricultural lands.  Taxes collected from the operation of 
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the commercial poultry farms range from PhP9,000 to PhP12,000 per farm.14  The maximum 
annual tax collection from the operation of the commercial farms is merely PhP324,000.00, not 
enough to make a dent in the development effort of the town. 
 
The overall setup of the contract poultry farming in Alaminos allows for the integrator to 
squeeze the contract growers for production efficiency.  In turn, the contract grower squeezes the 
workers in terms of very low wages, which are about PhP3,000  or US$55 a month.    
 
 
 
 
4.  EFFECTS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION ON POULTRY INDUSTRY 
 
 
Increased imports resulting from WTO commitments 
 
There was significant trade liberalization in the agriculture sector in the Philippines as a result of 
the country’s obligations under the WTO.  Implementation of the commitments began in 1995.  
The effects on the livestock sector in terms of increased imports were very significant.  
 
Table 23 shows the local production and imports of dressed chicken.  The import volume jumped 
from about 199 metric tons in 1996 to 966 metric tons in 1997 and to 2,417metric tons in 1998 
and then to 29,316 tons in 1999.  Other livestock also experienced import increases.  Table 24 
shows the import of pork rising from 695 metric tons in 1994 to 2,183 metric tons in 1995 and to 
6,072 metric tons in 1996. 
 
Under the WTO commitments, the Philippines maintains two tariff rates for selected products.  
The country commits to apply the lower tariff rate (termed in-quota tariff) to a certain minimum 
volume of imports.  This enables market access for other countries.  The higher tariff rate (out-
of-quota rate) applies to import volumes beyond the quota.   It is the combination of the 
minimum access volume (MAV) and the lower tariff applying to this volume that facilitates 
imports. 
 
For live poultry, the in-quota tariff rate was set at 40% for the whole of 1996 to 2000.  The out-
quota rate was 80% in 1996, 65% in 1997-98 and 50% in 1999-2000.  For poultry meat, the in-
quota rate was 50% in 1996 and then 45% for 1997-2000, while the out-quota rate was 100% 
(1996), 80% (1997-98) and dropping to 60% (2000).    (Habito 2002: p33) 
 
Table 25 shows the increase MAVs that the country committed at the WTO for several 
agricultural items for the years 1995 to 2005.  For live poultry the MAV was 2.6 million heads in 
1995, rising to 9.3 million in 2004 before declining in 2005.  For fresh/frozen/chilled poultry the 
MAV was 7,300 metric tons (MT) in 1995, rising to a peak of  23,000 metric tons in 2004.   
 
                                                 
14
 From the Office of the Treasurer, Municipality of Alaminos. 
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Table 23:  Production and Imports of Dressed Chicken, Philippines. 1990-1999  
(in metric tons) 
 
 
YEAR PRODUCTION IMPORTS TOTAL 
1990 229,273 190000 229,463 
1991 286,874 34000 286,908 
1992 356,398 41000 356,439 
1993 364,481 113000 364,594 
1994 376,607 198000 376,805 
1995 399,551 191000 399,742 
1996 455,097 200000 455,296 
1997 496,686 966000 497,653 
1998 491,226  2,417000 493,643 
1999 496,429        29,316 525,745 
 
 
 
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, Department of Agriculture;  Habito 2002 Table2-2b. 
 
 
 
 
Table 24:   Production and Imports of Pork, Philippines, 1990-1998 (in metric tons) 
 
 
YEAR PRODUCTION IMPORTS TOTAL 
1990 824,545.01000 1,177.01000 825,722.02000 
1991 845,189.00000 741.47000 845,930.47000 
1992 845,256.46000 793.38000 846,049.84000 
1993 880,944.91000 418.47000 881,363.38000 
1994 921,760.63000 695.37000 922,456.00000 
1995 969,862.46000 2,183.42000 972,045.88000 
1996 1,035,808.19000 6,072.96000 1,041,881.15000 
1997 1,085,544.33000 10,369.22000 1,095,913.55000 
1998 1,123,747.85000 12,592.88000 1,136,340.73000 
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, Department of Agriculture 
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Table 25: Minimum Access Volumes Committed to WTO, 1995-2005 
PRODUCT UNIT YEAR 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Live horse, asses, 
mules & hinnies 
Head 29 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 29 
Other live bovine 
animals  
Head 
(000) 
6.1 12.7 13.6 14.6 15.4 16.3 17.2 18.1 19 19.9 10.2 
Live swine  Head 
(000) 
1.3 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 1.3 
Other live goats  Head 
(000) 
24.7 51.2 54.9 58.5 62.2 65.8 69.5 73.1 76,803 80,461 41,075 
Live poultry  Head 
(000) 
2,569 5,634 6,342 6,765 7,188 7,611 8,034 8,456 8,879 9,302 5,328 
Beef fresh/chilled MT 2,000 4,087 4,261 4,436 4,611 4,785 4,959 5,134 5,308 5,483 2,786 
Beef frozen  MT 
(000) 
0 21.1 57.1 71.3 85.6 98.4 108.3 119.1 131 144.1 72 
Pork 
fresh/chilled/frozen  
MT 
(000) 
16.3 33.7 36.1 38.5 41 43.4 45.8 48.2 50.6 53 27.1 
Goat meat 
fresh/chilled/frozen 
MT 335 695 745 795 845 895 945 995 1,045 1,095 560 
Poultry 
fresh/chilled/frozen  
MT 
(000) 
7.3 15.2 16.2 16.7 17.7 18.8 19.8 20.9 21.9 23 10.4 
Potatoes 
fresh/chilled 
MT 465 965 1,035 1,102 1,171 1,240 1,309 1,378 1,447 1,516 772 
Coffee, roasted/not, 
decaff/not; husks & 
skin...  
MT 5 927 993 1,060 1,126 1,192 1,258 1,324 1,391 1,457 745 
Maize, other than 
seed  
MT 
(000) 
65.1 135 144.6 154.3 164 173.6 183.2 192.8 202.5 212.1 108.5 
Rice  MT 
(000) 
29.9 61.5 65.1 97.1 112 119.5 134.4 164.3 194.1 224 142.2 
Sugar  MT 
(000) 
19.2 39.8 42.7 45.5 48.4 51.2 54.1 56.9 59.8 62.6 32 
Soluble coffee MT 0 20 21 23 25 26 28 30 32 35 37 
Source: MAV Management Committee, Department of Agriculture; cited in Habito (2002). 
MT:  metric ton 
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Table 26: Imports, Exports and Food Balance Sheet of Chicken, Philippines, 1990-1999 
(Metric ton) 
ITEM YEAR 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Domestic 
supply 
267,086 291,707 356,439 346,584 363,047 399,775 455,297 497,648 493,643 525,745 
 
Production 266,960 291,680 356,398 346,600 362,970 399,551 455,097 496,686 491,226 496,429 
 
Imports 185 34 41 112 183 224 200 962 2,417 29,316 
 
Exports 59 7  128 106      
Domestic 
utilization 
267,086 291,707 356,439 346,584 363,047 399,775 455,297 497,648 493,643 525,745 
 
Processed 
for food 
53,417 58,341 71,288 69,317 72,609 79,955 91,059 99,530 98,729 105,149 
 
Food 213,669 233,366 285,151 277,267 290,438 319,820 364,238 398,118 394,914 420,596 
Source: National Statistical Coordination Board, June 2001; cited in Habito (2002) 
 
 
 
However, the actual volume of imports is not necessarily the same as the MAV.   Data in 
Gonzales (2003: p448) show that the rate of utilization of the MAV for live poultry was zero in 
1995 to 2001.   In the case of fresh/chilled/frozen poultry, the MAV was 16,160 tonnes in 1997 
and the utilization rate (UR) was 9.9%, indicating actual imports under the MAV of 1,600 
tonnes.  In 1998 the MAV was 16,701 tonnes and the UR was 16.2%, thus actual imports were 
2,705 tonnes.  In 1999 the MAV was 17,746 tonnes, the UR went up to 90.9% and actual imports 
surged to 16,131 tonnes.  In 2000 the MAV was 18,790 tonnes, the UR was 62.9% and actual 
imports were 11,819 tonnes.  And in 2001, the MAV was 19,834 tonnes, the UR was 59.6% and 
actual imports were 11,821 tonnes.    It can be seen from this the volume of imports of 
fresh/chilled/frozen poultry under the MAV scheme jumped by more than ten-fold from 1,600 
tonnes in 1997 to 16,131 tonnes in 1999 before dropping a little to around 12,000 tonnes in 
2000-2001. 
 
Table 26 shows the situation regarding chicken domestic production, imports, exports and 
domestic supply between l990 to l999. The table shows the significant increase of imports after 
the entry of the Philippines to WTO.  The import volume rose from 200 metric tones in 1996 to 
29,316 tonnes in 1999. 
 
The effects of the country’s import liberalization were felt at the local community level, as the 
case study shows.  In Alaminos, due to reduced demand as a result of the rise in imports of 
chicken, loading to contract growers were generally reduced by as much as 60%, with a 
 51
proportionate reduction in the number of contract workers.  In some cases, loading was delayed 
and the workers had to wait for a longer period between the renewal of contracts.  As salaries are 
very low, there is no mad scramble for the jobs at poultry farms.  In fact, most farm hands are not 
from Alaminos.  Those from Alaminos are often hired as administration staff, receiving 
PhP4,000 to PhP5,000 each, almost double the minimum salaries of farm hands.  Administrative 
staff comprise about a tenth of the total work force. 
 
Since the contract growers’ main assets are their real estate properties, they have several options 
in case of a crisis in the industry, similar to what that happened when there was a glut in the 
market.  The can  (1) wait till the crisis dies down; (2) shift to other types of  growing, for 
example, from broiler to breeder or layer; or (3) rent out their farm to new entrants.  Of course, 
these options are all contingent on the final say of the integrators.   
 
 
Market Access and the Matter of Subsidies 
 
The Philippine government does not provide any export subsidies to the poultry industry.  The 
players are left on their own to compete with subsidized produce in the international market.  On 
the issue alone of export subsidies, the poultry industry cannot hope to survive the competition.   
Instead of accessing foreign markets, the domestic poultry industry has actually become 
vulnerable to competition from foreign imports in its own market.  Thus, when the country  
imported massive amounts of chicken and chicken parts in 1998-1999 (see Tables 25 and 26) in 
compliance with its  minimum access volume commitments to WTO,  immediately the effect 
was a reduction in poultry production and the consequent loss of revenues for the contract 
growers and the uncertainty of employment for the farm workers in Alaminos. 
 
The same is true in the case of inputs to poultry production.  The main ingredients in poultry 
feeds are corn and soya beans.  As large integrators gradually substituted corn with other feed 
grains, the linkage between the corn and the poultry sectors weakened [Guzman 1999].  With the 
entry of the Philippines to the WTO, the door was opened for the entry of cheap, subsidized feed 
grains. Table 27 shows the import of corn into the Philippines.  The import volume rose 
dramatically between 1994 to 1995 and 1996, following the implementation of the WTO 
obligations. In the poultry sector, feeds make up the biggest part of the production costs, 
especially for the small-scale growers. Large-scale operators have a better chance of surviving 
the increasing production costs and the competition it faces from imported poultry.  
 
The feed millers successfully petitioned the government into liberalizing corn importation, with 
the rationale that the high cost of production of domestic corn is stalling the development of the 
poultry industry.   The removal of corn from the protected list of agricultural commodities 
further depressed the already depressed domestic corn production as a result of competition from 
heavily subsidized cheap corn imports, among others.  The corn farmers in Alaminos who are 
planting corn for their own consumption can no longer hope to develop into commercial 
producers and much less into net exporters of corn feeds.  The local government of Alaminos is 
not motivated to encourage corn production since the local farmers are unable to compete with 
the cheap and subsidized imported corn. 
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Table 27: Imports of Corn (metric ton) and by Source (% of total),Philippines, 1994-1999 
ITEM YEAR  
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Corn 
      
Imports 
      
 Unmilled (metric ton) 893 208,024 402,345 300,731 113,118 145,150 
  USA (%) (99) (76) (70) (35) (85) (34) 
  Argentina (%)  (24) (20)   (24) 
  China (%)    (65) (14) (41) 
 Seed 1   2,226  4,310 
  Thailand (100)   (25)   
  India    (67)   
  USA      (46) 
  China      (24) 
 Sweet Corn 0      
  Australia (100)      
 Dried, whole, cut, sliced, broken 17      
 in powder, not further prepared       
  Indonesia (75)      
  Japan (25)      
 Groats & Meal of Maize  286     
  France  (56)     
  USA  (44)     
 Corn Flour   74 160   
  USA   (99) (64)   
  Netherlands    (13)   
  Spain    (12)   
Source: Habito 2002 (Table 2-3). 
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Meanwhile, the big feed millers, which are also the big integrators have a very wide latitude for 
deciding the sourcing of inputs.  They could choose to or not to import feed ingredients as they 
see fit depending on where the positive effect will point to.  
 
The local government unit does not have any support program for the poultry industry, neither 
for the commercial and backyard sectors, except that at the commencement of commercial 
contract growing in the early 1990s, the local government unit gave a one-year tax exemption.15 
 
 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
The liberalization of the import regime in the Philippines has led to increased imports of 
agricultural products into the country.  There is another consequence: the deepening of the 
dynamic in which the poultry industry becomes more concentrated.  There is increased 
domination by the big integrator concerns, which increasingly control not only the production of 
poultry, but also the supply of poultry feed, which constitutes the main cost of production.  As a 
result, the contract growers and the small backyard producers are increasingly marginalized. 
 
The case study shows up the high concentration in the poultry industry at the local level.  The 
dominant integrator in Alaminos is Vitarich Corp.  It is the sole source of breeders, layers, DOCs 
and feed grains for the contract growers as stipulated in individual contracts, and the main source 
even for the small, independent household producers.   
 
This dominance is further strengthened by the complete dependence of the poultry industry in 
Alaminos, especially the contract growers, on poultry inputs such as feed grains.  The provision 
in the WTO agreements for differential tariffs on a minimum access volume (MAV) of imports 
and on imports above the MAV favours the large scale feed mills which are at the same time big 
integrators, as well as the organized large scale commercial hog and poultry firms.  Other 
independent poultry producers were effectively blocked from accessing preferential tariffs and 
had to contend with the higher domestic prices of corn and higher priced commercial mixed 
feeds.  The effect is for the small and medium scale independent producer to eventually die out.  
In addition, the historic linkage between the corn and the livestock and poultry sectors can be 
expected to weaken or to break, as corn production is further dampened. 
 
There is an utter lack of horizontal integration in that one sector’s output (corn production) does 
not figure in the equation, even in a minor role, as input to poultry feed requirements.  As a 
result, the growth in poultry production does not translate into a growth in corn production.  Corn 
                                                 
15
 Municipal Agricultural Office.  
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production in Alaminos remains where it is, production for personal consumption, even as 
commercial poultry production is enjoying unprecedented growth.  The potential is there for the 
country to achieve horizontal integration, at the very least, in the poultry and corn industry but 
country’s entry into the WTO diminished that potential. 
 
The poultry industry in Alaminos operates like an economic enclave, with the big player 
(integrator) and junior partners (contract growers) extracting huge profits from the operation,  
leaving the place of operation without a trace of economic improvement. After more than ten 
years of profitable commercial poultry farming in Alaminos, the town remains a 4th class 
municipality. 
 
While the poultry industry in Alaminos is enjoying steady growth, it will not be long before it 
too could suffer the fate of the corn industry.  The corn industry is a dying one as it is battered 
continuously by the influx of cheap, subsidized corn imports.  When more cheap, subsidized 
importation of chicken and chicken parts become the norm, the poultry industry in Alaminos 
could also be engulfed in a serious crisis. 
 
The situation of small-scale poultry growers in Alaminos is representative of what happened to 
this sector in other parts of the country. The direct impacts of agricultural liberalization as seen 
in this case show that there is not much to hope for in terms of changing the tide for a better 
future for these small and medium scale producers. Cost reduction can happen through 
economies of scale and vertical integration which is a domain that only the richer and bigger 
enterprises can afford.  
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